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Inmodern deregulated electricity market, price is playing a key role in signaling
the economic benefits to all participants. In particular, real-time price dynam-
ically reflects the actual marginal cost of generating electricity and directly as-
sociates with market settlement. Methods of quantifying the effect of real-time
pricing and optimal pricing policy design are needed to ensure reliable system
operation and improve economic efficiency. In this thesis, three problems asso-
ciated with real-time pricing in smart grid are studied.
First, the impacts of data quality on real-time locational marginal price
(LMP) is characterized. Because the real-time LMP is computed from the es-
timated network topology and system state, bad data that cause errors in topol-
ogy processing and state estimation affect real-time LMP. It is shown that the
power system state space is partitioned into price regions of convex polytopes.
Under different bad data models, the worst case impacts of bad data on real-
time LMP are analyzed. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate worst case
performance for IEEE-14 and IEEE-118 networks.
Second, the problem of designing dynamic price of electricity in retail market
is considered. For the day-ahead hourly pricing (DAHP) scheme, a Stackelberg
game model is formulated with the retailer as a leader and its customers as fol-
lowers. By solving a real-time load control problem, an affine structure between
the optimal demand response and day-ahead retail price is established and the
trade-off curve between consumer surplus (CS) and retail profit (RP) is charac-
terized as a concave Pareto front, on which each point is an equilibrium of the
Stackelberg game with a particular retailer’s payoff function. Effects of renew-
able energy and storage are also analyzed under the same Stackelberg game
model. It is shown that the tradeoff curves with renewable energy or storage
on the retailer side have significantly different characteristics from those ones
on the consumer side. Simulations based on actual weather and price data are
used to verify our statements.
Finally, the problem of optimal dynamic pricing for retail electricity with an
unknown demand model is considered. Without knowledge on the aggregated
demand function of its customers, a retailer aims to maximize its retail surplus
by sequentially adjusting its price based on the behavior of its customers in the
past. An online learning algorithm, referred to as piecewise linear stochastic
approximation (PWLSA), is proposed. It is shown that PWLSA achieves the
optimal rate of learning defined by the growth rate of cumulative regret. In
particular, the regret of PWLSA is shown to grow logarithmically with respect
to the learning horizon, and no other on-line learning algorithm can have the
growth rate slower than that of PWLSA. Simulation studies are presented using
traces of actual day-ahead prices, and PWLSA compares favorably under both
static and dynamically changing parameters.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview and motivation
Inmodern deregulated electricity market, price is playing a key role in signaling
the economic benefits to all participants. In particular, real-time price dynam-
ically reflects the actual marginal cost of generating electricity and directly as-
sociates with market settlement. Methods of quantifying the effect of real-time
pricing and optimal pricing policy design are needed to ensure reliable system
operation and improve economic efficiency. In this thesis, we studied both the
wholesale and retail electricity market, focusing on data quality for the former
and dynamic retail pricing design for the latter.
1.1.1 Wholesale market
Most deregulated wholesale electricity markets in U.S. have two interconnected
components. The day-ahead market determines the locational marginal price
(LMP) based on the dual variables of the optimal power flow (OPF) solution
[68, 45], given generator offers, demand forecast, system topology, and security
constraints. The calculation of LMP in the day-ahead market does not depend
on the actual system operation. In the real-time market, on the other hand, an
ex-post formulation is often used (e.g., by PJM and ISO-New England [73]) to
calculate the real-time LMP by solving an incremental OPF problem. The LMPs
in the day-ahead and the real-time markets are combined in the final clearing
and settlement processes.
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The real-time LMP is a function of data collected by the supervisory con-
trol and data acquisition (SCADA) system. Therefore, anomalies in data, if un-
detected, will affect prices in the real-time market. While the control center
employs a bad data detector to “clean” the real-time measurements, miss de-
tections and false alarms will occur inevitably. The increasing reliance on the
cyber system also comes with the risk that malicious data may be injected by
an adversary to affect system and real-time market operations. An intelligent
adversary can carefully design a data attack to avoid detection by the bad data
detector.
Regardless of the source of data errors, it is of significant value to assess
potential impacts of data quality on the real-time market, especially when a
smart grid may in the future deploy demand response based on real-time LMP.
To this end, we are interested in characterizing the impact of worst case data
errors on the real-time LMP. The focus on the worst case also reflects the lack of
an accurate model of bad data and our desire to include the possibility of data
attacks.
1.1.2 Demand response and retail market
As a key feature of a future smart grid, demand response is expected to of-
fer economic benefits to the consumers by taking advantage of features of a
smart grid and intelligent pricing mechanisms. Through various mechanisms,
demand response can reshape the customers’ consumption patterns. Properly
designed demand response program offers the potential to reduce the peak hour
energy usage, which gives system operator flexibility to improve the operating
2
efficiency and reliability, compensate the uncertainty introduced by renewable
integration, and in the end increase the social welfare.
According to a report of FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)
[20], existing demand response programs can be grouped into two categories,
incentive-based demand response and time-based rates. The incentive-based
programs offer participating consumers reduced price or some guaranteed eco-
nomic benefits through a long term contract, in exchange for some level of con-
trol power over the consumers’ energy usage. Examples[20] of such programs
include direct load control (where the consumers’ electric equipment can be
shut down or cycled remotely), interruptible/curtailable rates (where electric
consumption will be curtailed in case of emergency), demand bidding/buyback
programs (where dispatchable demand resource can participate in market bid-
ding), and etc. Although these programs give the operator the flexibility to
optimize system operating decisions or handle contingencies, a consumer loses
the ability to manage her own energy usage based on her own preference.
Alternatively, time-based rates use pricing mechanisms to affect the con-
sumers’ energy usage indirectly. In these programs, a consumer is empowered
to fully optimize her consumption, taking into account her needs and the price
signals provided by the retailer. This kind of programs makes more economic
sense and avoids many legal problems. Examples[20] include time-of-use rates
(where prices are pre-set for predetermined periods in advance), critical-peak
pricing(where prespecified high rates are imposed for a limited number of days
or hours in case of wholesale price peak or contingency), and real-time pricing
(retail price fluctuates hourly or more often, to reflect changes in the wholesale
price on either a day-ahead or hour-ahead basis).
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The advent of a smart grid makes the time-based rates demand response
potentially more attractive. By taking advantage of the enhanced sensing, com-
munication, and computation power at the consumer side, distributed energy
management allows the consumers to optimize individualized trade-offs be-
tween energy cost and the quality of service.
Currently, the structure of most electricity retail markets is monopoly and
the retail price is highly regulated. However, demand response programs
and wholesale market deregulation present nontrivial challenges to cope with
wholesale price fluctuations and dynamically managed consumer demand at
the same time. It is interesting to see how the retailer interact with its con-
sumers, via the dynamically designed retail price.
1.1.3 Renewable integration and demand response
Renewable integration in distribution networks is undergoing a phenomenal
growth. According to the latest data [1], the cumulative residential photovoltaic
(PV) installation grows from 1.1 GW in the first half of 2012 to 2.7GW in the first
half of 2014 with a 45% increase in the second quarter of 2014 over the same
quarter in 2013. The cumulative installation of utility PV is quadrupled from the
2012, reaching the level of 7 GW in 2014. These statistics suggests an accelerated
participation in renewable integration by both utilities and consumers.
The economics of renewable integration by the utility and that by individual
consumers are fundamentally different, even though both reduce the amount
of energy drawn from the transmission grid. For a consumer based renewable
integration, there is a current debate on the use of net metering that allows a
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consumer sell surplus electricity generated from its solar PV back to the utility
at the same price. It is apparent that net metering undermines the revenue of the
utility, making it difficult for the utility to maintain and invest in the distribution
infrastructure.
Therefore, the effect of renewable integration on the interaction between util-
ity and consumers is nontrivial and whether the consumers will benefit from
renewable integration or not becomes unclear.
1.2 Effect of data quality on real-time wholesale price
In this part, we aim to characterize the worst effects of data corruption on real-
time LMP. By “worst”, we mean the maximum perturbation of real-time LMP
caused by bad or malicious data, when a fixed set of data is subject to cor-
ruption. The complete characterization of worst data impact, however, is not
computationally tractable. Our goal here is to develop an optimization based
approach to search for locally worst data by restricting the network congestion
to a set of lines prone to congestion. We then apply computationally tractable
(greedy search) algorithms to find the worst data and evaluate the effects of
worst data by simulations.
1.2.1 Summary of results
In characterizing the relation between data and real-time LMP, we first present
a geometric characterization of the real-time LMP. In particular, we show that
the state space of the power system is partitioned into polytope price regions,
as illustrated in Fig. 1.1(a), where each polytope is associated with a unique
real-time LMP vector, and the price region Xi is defined by a particular set of
congested lines that determine the boundaries of the price region.
Removed due to
topology error
(a)  Bad meter data (b)  Topology error
State space
X0
X0
X1X1
X2
X2
X3
X4
xˆxˆ
x˜
Figure 1.1: Change of real-time LMPs due to bad data.
Two types of bad data are considered. One is the bad data associated with
meter measurements such as the branch power flows in the network. Such bad
data will cause errors in state estimation, possibly perturbing, as an example,
the correct state estimate xˆ in X0 to x˜ in X3 (as shown in Fig. 1.1(a)). The analysis
of the worst case data then corresponds to finding the worst measurement error
such that it perturbs the correct state estimation to the worst price region.
The second type of bad data, one that has not been carefully studied in the
context of LMP in the literature, is error in digital measurements such as switch
or breaker states. Such errors lead directly to topology errors therefore causing a
change in the polytope structure as illustrated in Fig. 1.1(b). In this case, even if
the estimated system state changes little, the prices associated with each region
change, sometimes quite significantly.
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Before characterizing impacts of bad meter data on LMP, we need to con-
struct appropriate models for bad data. To this end, we propose three increas-
ingly more powerful bad data models based on the dependencies on real-time
system measurements: state independent bad data, partially adaptive bad data,
and fully adaptive bad data.
In studying the worst case performance, we adopt a widely used approach
that casts the problem as one involving an adversary whose goal is to make the
system performance as poor as possible. The approach of finding the worst data
is equivalent to finding the optimal strategy of an attacker who tries to perturb
the real-time LMP and avoid being detected at the same time. By giving the
adversary more information about the network state and endowing him with
the ability to change data, we are able to capture the worst case performance,
sometimes exactly and sometimes as bounds on performance.
Finally, we perform simulation studies using the IEEE-14 and IEEE-118 net-
works. We observe that bad data independent of the system state seems to
have limited impact on real-time LMPs, and greater price perturbations can be
achieved by state dependent bad data. The results also demonstrate that the
real-time LMPs are subject to much larger perturbation if bad topology data are
present in addition to bad meter data.
While substantial price changes can be realized for small networks by the
worst meter data, as the size of network grows while the measurement redun-
dancy rate remains the same, the influence of worst meter data on LMP is re-
duced. However, larger system actually gives more possibilities for the bad
topology data to perturb the real-time LMP more significantly.
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Our simulation results also show a degree of robustness provided by the
nonlinear state estimator. While there have been many studies on data injection
attacks based on DC models, very few consider the fact that the control center
typically employs the nonlinear state estimator under the AC model. Our sim-
ulation shows that effects of bad analog data designed based on DCmodel may
be mitigated by the nonlinear estimator whereas bad topology data coupled
with bad analog data can have greater impacts on LMP.
1.2.2 Related Work
Effects of bad data on power system have been studied extensively in the past,
see [5, 23, 60]. Finding the worst case bad data is naturally connected with the
problem of malicious data. In this context, the results presented here can be
viewed as one of analyzing the impact of the worst (malicious) data attack.
In a seminal paper by Liu, Ning, and Reiter [46], the authors first illustrated
the possibility that, by compromising enough number of meters, an adversary
can perturb the state estimate arbitrarily in some subspace of the state space
without being detected by any bad data detector. Such attacks are referred to
as strong attacks. It was shown by Kosut et al. [38] that the condition for the
existence of such undetectable attacks is equivalent to the classical notion of
network observability.
When the adversary can only inject malicious data from a small number of
meters, strong attacks do not exist, and any injected malicious data can be de-
tected with some probability. Such attacks are referred to as weak attacks [38].
In order to affect the system operation in some meaningful way, the adversary
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has to risk being detected by the control center. The impacts of weak attack on
power system are not well understood because the detection of such bad data
is probabilistic. Our results are perhaps the first to quantify such impacts. Most
related research works focused on DC model and linear estimator while only
few have addressed the nonlinearity effect [28, 27].
It is well recognized that bad data can also cause topology errors [67, 16],
and techniques have been developed to detect topology errors. For instance, the
residue vector from state estimation was analyzed for topology error detection
[16, 67, 19]. Monticelli [50] introduced the idea of generalized state estimation
where, roughly speaking, the topology that fits the meter measurements best is
chosen as the topology estimate. The impacts of topology errors on electricity
market have not been reported in the literature, and our work aims to bridge
this gap.
The effect of data quality on real-time market was first considered in [66, 69].
In [69], the authors presented the financial risks induced by the data perturba-
tion and proposed a heuristic technique for finding a case where price change
happens. While there are similarities between our work and [69], several signif-
icant differences exist: (i) We focus on finding the worst case, not only a feasible
case. (ii) Our work considers a more general class of bad data where bad data
may depend dynamically on the actual systemmeasurements rather than static.
(iii) We consider a broader range of bad data that also include bad topology
data, and our evaluations are based on the AC network model and the presence
of nonlinear state estimator.
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1.3 Interactions between electricity retailer and consumers
In this part, we consider a demand response scheme based on price incentives
provided by the retailer and distributed energy management by its customers.
In particular, we focus on a specific pricing scheme, named day-ahead hourly
pricing (DAHP), where the hourly prices are posted one day ahead by the re-
tailer, while the payment is settled in real time as the product of the consumers’
dynamic electricity usage and the fixed day-ahead hourly prices.
The advantage of DAHP is twofold. For a consumer, DAHP gives her the
price certainty one day ahead of time so that she can plan accordingly based on
the posted prices and her desired quality of service. On the other hand, DAHP
allows the retailer to adjust its prices on a day-to-day basis, taking into account
operating conditions at the wholesale market (such as the day-ahead wholesale
price) and environmental factors (such as temperatures and projected renew-
able generations). A central theme here is therefore the complete characteriza-
tion of the DAHP induced tradeoffs between consumer surplus and retail profit.
Integrating renewable energy into distributed networks makes the problem
more complicated. Is consumer based renewable integration good for con-
sumers? The answer may be less obvious than it appears at the first glance.
When the utility is a regulatedmonopoly, the loss of demand from the consumer
may force the utility to raise the price of electricity, which affects the consumer
surplus. If the consumer’s capacity of renewable integration is not sufficiently
high to have net zero consumption, he may be worse off than he is in absence of
local renewable integration. Such schemes also place unproportionally heavy
burden on those without privately installed renewable generation.
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What happens for the centralized renewable integration owned by or con-
tracted to a utility? The access to renewable by the utility reduces the amount of
power procured from the wholesale market and allows the utility hedge against
real-time price spikes in the wholesale market. Will the utility transfer at least
part of the surplus from the renewable integration back to its consumers? For
example, will both the utility and the end consumer benefit if the utility pro-
vides a rate discount to the consumer by operating andmaintaining consumer’s
roof top PV installations?
1.3.1 Summary of results
We present a Stackelberg game model to analyze and optimize a DAHP based
demand response, with the retailer as a leader and the consumers as followers.
For HVAC∗ demands, the optimal demand response is formulated by solving a
distributed stochastic program that maximizes the consumer surplus. The opti-
mal solution to the program reveals an affine structure of the demand function.
For the retailer, on the other hand, under various payoff functions, the optimal
DAHPs are obtained via convex optimizations.
We provide a complete characterization of the Pareto front of the trade-off
between consumer surplus (CS) and retail profit (RP), as illustrated in Fig. 1.2.
We show that the Pareto front that characterizes the optimal tradeoff is given
by a concave and monotonically decreasing function of the consumer surplus.
It consists of Stackelberg equilibria achievable by optimized DAHP; any CS-RP
pair above the Pareto front is not attainable.
∗heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
11
Consumer Surplus (CS)
Retail Profit (RP)
πo
πsw
πr
∆
Figure 1.2: CS-RP trade-off curve with different dynamic pricing
schemes
We can place several well known pricing schemes on the CS-RP plane. In
particular, the social welfare maximizing price πsw is shown to result in zero
retail profit, which means that social welfare maximization is not economically
viable to the retailer. The optimal regulated monopoly price πr is located at
the Pareto front where the retailer profit has a regulated profit margin ∆. The
retailer profit maximization price is πo when no constraint is imposed on the
retailer. We note also that benchmark pricing schemes such as constant pricing
and proportional markup pricing are strictly inside Pareto front, indicating that
benefits can be improved for both the consumers and the retailer.
We also consider the effects of incorporating renewable energy and storage
devices on either the utility side or the consumer side. We are interested in
particular the change of the Pareto front when as more renewable sources are
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utilized or higher capacity of storage is made available.
We compare two models of renewable generation: the first is a centralized
utility-based model in which the utility owns and operates the renewable gener-
ation as part of its portfolio of energy resources. The second is a decentralized
consumer-based model in which a consumer owns and operates the renewable
generation and is allowed to sell back surplus electricity in a net-metering set-
ting. These models are of course stylized abstractions that differ from practical
implementations; the two models coexist in practice as indicated by the recent
PV installation statistics [1]. However, the main features that underline the de-
bate on net metering are retained.
To analyze effects of renewable integration on the utility and the consumer,
we characterize the Pareto frontier in the tradeoff between the retail profit of the
utility and the consumer surplus. Because the Pareto frontier specifies the max-
imum achievable consumer surplus for a fixed retail profit, we are able to com-
pare the corresponding consumer surpluses from different integration models
by analyzing their associated Pareto frontiers.
We obtain the following analytical results using a Stackleberg game analysis
under the net metering mechanism where the prices of purchasing from and
selling to the utility are the same. A graphical sketch of the results is shown in
Fig. 1.3.
Centralized utility-based integration For the utility-based renewable integra-
tion, as expected, the Pareto frontier is strictly above that when there is no re-
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Figure 1.3: Trade-off curves with renewable integration: (a) Utility based
renewable integration. (b) Consumer-based renewable
integration.
newable integration, as shown in Fig. 1.3(a). Our result, however, quantifies the
benefit and shows how the benefit of renewable integration is distributed be-
tween the utility and the consumers. In particular, we show in Theorem 6 that,
the retailer distributes the benefit of wind integration only if the wind power ca-
pacity K exceeds a certain threshold. As K increases, the benefits from wind in-
tegration apportioned to consumer increases monotonically. The implication is
that, for a regulated monopoly, the consumer always benefits indirectly from central-
ized renewable integration by the utility in the sense that its consumer surplus always
is increased.
Decentralized consumer-based integration For the consumer-based integra-
tion, we show that in Theorem 7 the Pareto frontier intersects with the Pareto
frontier when there is no renewable integration, as illustrated in Fig. 1.3(b). This
means that, if the regulated profit is to be maintained by the monopolistic utility, the
consumer may wind up with a lower level consumer surplus. In other words, con-
sumer owned and operated renewable may be bad for consumers. This perhaps
is unexpected at first the glance; it does confirm the intuition that the reduction
of consumption forces the regulated utility to increase the price of electricity,
14
which lowered the consumer surplus.
Similar results are also shown for storage devices. For the case that energy
storage device is used by the utility, we show that the trade-off curve is simply
shifted up by the amount of arbitrage profit over the wholesale price, as shown
in Fig 1.4. On the other hand, when the storage device is owned by the con-
sumers, the consumers’ HVAC control policy remains the same while the total
demand is changed purely by the amount of storage control. The consumer sur-
plus is increased by the arbitrage profit over retail price. Theorem 8 proves that
with consumer-based storage, the maximized social welfare will increase while
the maximized profit will decrease under some conditions. Therefore, the new
trade-off curve will cross with the original one, as shown in Fig 1.4. Theorem 8
also shows that if the utility-based storage has the same parameters as the ag-
gregated consumer-based storage, the trade-off curve with utility-based storage
will be completely outside the one with consumer-based storage. This shows
that centralized control is more efficient than the distributed control under this
monopoly retail market structure. Simulations of the effect of energy storage
devices are presented in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7 in Section 3.5.5.
Numerical results for consumers with thermal load are using more realistic
parameters to confirm the analytical results.
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Figure 1.4: Trade-off curves with storage
1.3.2 Related work
The study of dynamic electricity pricing at retail level appeared along with the
beginning of wholesale market deregulation. In [12, 11], based on a simplified
model and simulations, the authors demonstrate the benefit of introducing dy-
namic pricing, including economic incentive to the demand side and long-run
operation efficiency. Practical programs of dynamic pricing, including DAHP
considered here, have been implemented by the utility companies among U.S.,
such as NiagaraMohawk [25], Georgia Power, Gulf Power and etc. By empirical
study, the authors of [25], where the name of DAHP is adopted from, conclude
that DAHP “not only improves the linkage between wholesale and retail mar-
kets, but also promotes the development of retail competition.” The effect and
benefit of DAHP have also been studied theoretically in [12], which shows that
DAHP provides more benefits to consumers and can attract, in the long run, all
the consumers, compared with other pricing schemes such as flat rate and time
of use (TOU).
16
However, those schemes are either ad-hoc or just passing the wholesale price
with some mark-up to the consumers, without any optimization as considered
in our work. In [15, 17], a comprehensive framework of retail price optimization
is formulated, by considering the consumer side uncertainty and the resulted
financial risk. Relative to this line of existing work, the main contribution of our
work is the optimized DAHP, the use of a Stackelberg game model to obtain
a full characterization of the trade-off between the achievable retail profit and
consumer surplus, and the effect of renewable energy on the trade-off curve.
In our work, a Stackelberg game model is used to formulate the relationship
between a retailer and its consumers. A similar idea can be found in [48], which
finds the optimal retail price to induce social welfare maximization consump-
tion under a repeated Stackelberg game model. [71] also uses a game theoretical
setting to study the interactive retail market structure, based on an abstract and
static model for the price responsive demand.
Extensive research work has been done focusing on demand response opti-
mization. Several recent studies are using a distributed fashion to find the social
welfare maximization consumption, where retail price is an ancillary variable
in each iteration and a by-product after the optimization. For example, [31] de-
signs a hierarchical market structure that includes the loads at the bottom layer,
load service entities at the middle layer, and a independent service operator at
the top. By exchanging decisions between different layers in each iteration, a
global solution will be achieved with guaranteed convergence, while the oper-
ator dose not need to know full information about the appliances in the bottom
layer. Focusing on the retail level optimization, a similar distributed algorithm
is used to achieve social welfare maximization in [43]. The contract design be-
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tween the renewable generators and the aggregator is studied in [54], where the
aggregator is responsible for a large scale PHEV charging.
Renewable integration and usage of energy storage are also among the re-
cent hot topics in smart grid research, especially with the help of demand re-
sponse programs, while most of them are without addressing the benefit-cost
tradeoff in the interactions between the utility and consumers. A relevant work
is the contract design between the renewable generators and the aggregator
studied in [54], where the aggregator is responsible for a large scale PHEV
charging. The work in [53] shows that by coupling with deferrable loads, the
costs resulting from the randomness of wind power supply can be significantly
mitigated, which makes large scale wind power integration possible without
the need of significant investments in backup generation. Relevant to our work,
[14] shows that electricity rates must increase for utility companies to recover
their fixed costs when PVs are implemented while higher electricity rates give
households more incentives to adopt PVs based on constant demand profiles.
For consumer-based energy storage, [70] formulates an stochastic optimization
problem and characterizes the properties of economic value of energy storage.
Similar ideas can also be found in [62, 39]. Distinct from the topics in those pa-
pers, to our knowledge, our work is the first to study the effect of renewable
energy and storage on the interaction between retailer and consumers. See also
e.g., [32, 61] on the constraints and allocation of embedded renewable sources,
[63] on the impact of renewable on the distribution systems, [26] on pricing
and congestion management, and [59, 64] on the control and optimization of
distributed generation. There is a substantial literature on optimal demand re-
sponse. See recent work in [44, 31] and references therein.
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1.4 Online learning of dynamic retail price
As we discussed above in Section 1.3, the consumer’s demand is a affine func-
tion of the retail price. If a retailer knows how its customers respond to the retail
price through their individual demand functions, it can choose the price to op-
timize a particular objective, e.g., the social welfare or its own profit subject to
regulations. Obtaining the demand functions of its customers, however, is non-
trivial because a customer is likely to consider such information private; neither
the willingness of sharing nor the correctness of the shared information can be
assumed.
Our work focuses on optimal dynamic pricing under unknown demand
functions. We take an online learning approach where the retailer learns the be-
havior of its customers by observing their response to carefully designed prices.
The basic principle of online learning is to achieve a tradeoff between “explo-
ration” and “exploitation;” the former represents the need of using sufficiently
rich pricing signals to achieve learning accuracy, whereas the latter stands for
the need of capturing as much reward as possible based on what has been
learned.
In the classical online learning theory, the performance of a learning algo-
rithm is measured by the notion of cumulative regret. For the pricing problem
at hand, the regret is defined as the difference between the retail surplus associ-
ated with the actual aggregated demand function and the surplus achieved by
an online learning algorithm. While the cumulative regret RT grows with the
learning horizon T , the rate of growth, RT/T , of a well designed on-line learn-
ing algorithm typically diminishes, which implies that, for the infinite horizon
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problem, the profit achieved per unit time without knowing the demand func-
tion matches that when the demand function is known. Therefore, a relevant
performance metric is the growth rate of regret RT vs. T .x
1.4.1 Summary of results
The basic problem setting involves two players: a retailer (an electricity distribu-
tor or aggregator) who offers its customer day-ahead hourly dynamic prices and
its customers with price responsive demands. We focus on the case when the
customer demands are elastic and can be described by a random affine model,
which arises naturally for thermal control applications.
The main result of our work is twofold. First, under the DAHP mechanism,
we propose a simple online learning algorithm, referred to as piecewise linear
stochastic approximation (PWLSA), that has the logarithmic rate of growth in
regret, i.e. RT (T ) = Θ(log T ).
On the other hand, we show that no other on-line learning algorithm can
have the rate slower than that of PWLSA. Thus PWLSA is order optimal. To
achieve the optimal rate of learning, we deviate the standard on-line learning
approach by first analyzing the mechanism of the two-settlement wholesale
electricity market and calculate the retail surplus of the retailer as a wholesale
market participant in a simple set-up. The result shows that the retailer’s loss
of surplus is proportional to the 2-norm deviation of the real-time consumption
from the day-ahead schedule.
To demonstrate the learning performance, we also conduct simulations to
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compare PWLSA with the Greedy Method based on the actual data. In both
cases with static and dynamically changing parameters of the demand model,
PWLSA outperformed the greedy method and converged fast towards the opti-
mal price.
1.4.2 Related work
The problem of dynamic pricing for demand response assuming known de-
mand functions has been extensively studied. See, for example, [12, 11, 25],
which adopted a similar pricing scheme as considered here and [15, 17, 71] for
more general settings. A precursor of the work presented here is [29] where
a parametric form of demand function was obtained. In [30], the tradeoff be-
tween retail profit and consumer surplus was characterized under a Stackelberg
formulation with known demand functions.
The general problem of online learning for dynamic pricing has been stud-
ied extensively in multiple communities. This problem can be formulated as a
multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem by treating each possible price as an arm.
When the price can only take finite possible values, the problem becomes the
classic MAB for which Lai and Robbins showed that the optimal regret growth
rate is Θ(log T ) when the arms generate independent reward [42]. When the
price takes value from an uncountable set, the dynamic pricing problem is an
example of the so-called continuum-armed bandit introduced by Agrawal in
[6] where the arms form a compact subset of R. An online learning policy
with regret order of O(T 3/4) was proposed in [6] for any reward function sat-
isfying Lipschitz continuity. Further development on the continuum-armed
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bandit under various assumptions of the unknown reward function can be
found in [36, 8, 18]. The reason that our proposed PWLSA achieves a much
better regret order (Θ(log T )) than in the case of a general continuum-armed
bandit is due to the specific linearly parameterized demand which leads to a
specific quadratic cost/reward function. A similar message can be found in
[37, 58, 13, 24, 72] where different regret orders were shown to be achievable
under different classes of demand models for dynamic pricing.
The problem considered here deals with linearly parameterized demand
functions, thanks to the closed-form characterization of the optimized demand
function for thermal dynamic load obtained in [30]. Our proposed learning ap-
proach is rooted from a stochastic approximation problem originally formulated
by Lai and Robbins [40, 41] where the authors considered a form of optimal
control problem when the model contains unknown parameters and the cost of
control is explicitly modeled. For scaler models, Lai and Robbins showed in
[40, 41] that the cumulative regret (if translated from our definition) of a simple
linear stochastic approximation scheme grows at the rate of O(log T ). However,
it is not clear whether such growth rate is the lowest possible. Our result pro-
vides a generalization to the vector case with a lower bound for general policies.
In addition, our approach also allows the consumers to have variable demand
levels whereas the algorithm presented in [40, 41] only allows a single constant
demand target.
Also related is the work of Bertsimas and Perakis [10] who tackled the prob-
lem as a dynamic program with incomplete state information. The authors
showed in numerical simulations that considerable gain can be realized over
the myopic policy where the price in the next stage is based on the least squares
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estimate of the model parameter. When the parameters are assumed to be ran-
dom, Lobo and Boyd considered the same problem under a Bayesian setting [47]
and proposed a randomized policy via a dithering mechanism. In both cases,
the rate of learning is not characterized.
Machine learning techniques have been applied to pricing problems in elec-
tricity markets, although there seems to be limited literature on discovering real-
time price with unknown demand functions at the retail level. While such prob-
lems can be viewed as part of the general learning problem discussed above, the
nature of electricity market and electricity demand impose special constraints.
When the market has multiple strategic generators, Garcia et al. proposed an
online learning algorithm which converges to the Markov perfect equilibria
[21]. A related learning problem of bidding strategy of a retailer in the whole-
sale market when the supply functions of the generators are unknown has been
studied. See [57, 56, 55] where Q-learning techniques have been applied. Some
other research focuses on developing learning methods for optimal demand re-
sponse. See [65] for index policy by formulating the demand control as a restless
bandit problem, and [51] for a reinforcement learning solution to a partially ob-
servable Markov decision process (MDP) problem.
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CHAPTER 2
EFFECT OF DATA QUALITY ON REAL-TIMEWHOLESALE PRICE
2.1 Structures of Real-Time LMP
We present first a model for the computation of real-time locational marginal
price (LMP). While ISOs have somewhat different methods of computing real-
time LMP, they share the same two-settlement architecture and similar ways of
using real-time measurements. In the following, we will use a simplified ex-
post real-time market model, adopted by PJM, ISO New England, and other
ISOs [52, 73]. We view this model as a convenient mathematical abstraction
that captures the essential components of the real-time LMP calculation. For
this reason, our results should be interpreted within the specified setup. Our
purpose is not to include all details; we aim to capture the essential features.
In real-time, in order to monitor and operate the system, the control center
will calculate the estimated system conditions (including bus voltages, branch
flows, generation, and demand) based on real-time measurements. We call a
branch congested if the estimated flow is larger than or equal to the security
limit. The congestion pattern is defined as the set of all congested lines, denoted
as ˆC. Note that we use hat (e.g., ˆC) to denote quantities or sets that are estimated
based on real-time measurements. Details of state estimation and bad data de-
tection are discussed in Section 2.2.3.
One important usage of state estimation is calculating the real-time LMP.
Given the estimated congestion pattern ˆC, the following linear program is
solved to find the incremental OPF dispatch and associated real-time LMP,
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ˆλ = (ˆλi) [52]:
minimize
∑
cGi ∆pi −
∑
cLj∆d j
subjcet to
∑
∆pi =
∑
∆d j
∆pmini ≤ ∆pi ≤ ∆p
max
i
∆dminj ≤ ∆d j ≤ ∆dmaxj∑
i Aki∆pi −
∑
j Ak j∆d j ≤ 0, for all k ∈ ˆC,
(2.1)
where ∆d = (∆d j) is the vector of incremental dispatchable load, ∆p = (∆pi)
the vector of incremental generation dispatch, cG = (cGi ) and cL = (cLj) the corre-
sponding real-time marginal cost of generations and dispatchable loads, ∆pmini
and ∆pmaxi the lower and upper bounds for incremental generation dispatch,
∆dmini and ∆dmaxi the lower and upper bounds for incremental dispatchable load,
and Aki the sensitivity of branch flow on branch k with respect to the power
injection at bus i.
The real-time LMP at bus i is defined as the overall cost increase when one
unit of extra load is added at bus i, which is calculated as
ˆλi = η −
∑
k∈ ˆC
Akiµk. (2.2)
where η is the dual variable for the load-generation equality constraint, and µk
is the dual variable corresponding to the line flow constraint in (2.1).
Note that in practice, the control center may use the ex-ante congestion pat-
tern, which is obtained by running a 5 minute ahead security-constrained eco-
nomic dispatch with the state estimation results and the forecasted loads (for
the next five-minute interval) and choosing the lines congested at the dispatch
solution [52, 73]. However, to avoid the complication due to ex-ante dispatch
calculation, we assume that real-time pricing employs the estimated congestion
pattern ˆC obtained from state estimation results. By doing so, we attempt to find
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direct relations among bad data, the state estimate, and real-time LMPs. Notice
that once the congestion pattern ˆC is determined, the whole incremental OPF
problem (2.1) no longer depends on the measurement data.
Under the DC model, the power system state, x, is defined as the vector of
voltage phases, except the phase on the reference bus. The power flow vector f
is a function of the system state x,
f = Fx, (2.3)
where F is the sensitivity matrix of branch flowswith respect to the system state.
Assume the system has n+1 buses. Then, x ∈ X = [−π, π]n, whereX represents
the state space. Any system state corresponds to a unique point in X. From
(2.3), the branch flow f is determined by the system state x. Comparing the
flows with the flow limits, we obtain the congestion pattern associated with this
state. Hence, each point in the state space corresponds to a particular congestion
pattern.
We note that the above expression in (2.2) appears earlier in [68] where the
role of congestion state in LMP computation was discussed. Here, our objective
is to make explicit the connection between data and LMP. We therefore need
a linkage between data and congestion. To this end, we note that the power
system state, the congestion state, and LMP form a Markov chain, which led to
a geometric characterization of LMP on the power system state space, as shown
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Price Partition of the State Space) Assume that the LMP exists for
every possible congestion pattern∗. Then, the state space X is partitioned into a set
∗This is equivalent to assuming that the derivative of the optimal value of (2.1) with respect
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of polytopes {Xi} where the interior of each Xi is associated with a unique congestion
pattern Ci and a real-time LMP vector. Each boundary hyperplane of Xi is defined by a
single transmission line.
Proof 1 For a particular congestion pattern C defined by a set of congested lines, the
set of states that gives C is given by
Xi
∆
={x : Fi·x ≥ Tmaxi ∀i ∈ C, F j·x < Tmaxj ∀ j < C},
where Fi· is the ith row of F (see (2.3)), and Tmaxj the flow limit on branch j. Since Xi
is defined by the intersection of a set of half spaces, it is a polytope.
Given an estimated congestion pattern ˆC, the envelop theorem [49] implies that for
any optimal primal solution and dual solution of (2.1) that satisfy the KKT conditions,
(2.2) always gives the derivative of the optimal objective value with respect to the de-
mand at each bus, which we assume exists, i.e., each congestion pattern is associated
with a unique real-time LMP vector λ. Hence, all states with the same congestion pat-
tern share the same real-time LMP, which means each polytope Xi in X corresponds to a
unique real-time LMP vector.
Theorem 1 characterizes succinctly the relationship between the system state
and LMP. As illustrated in Fig. 1.1(a), if bad data are to alter the LMP in real-
time, the size of the bad data has to be sufficiently large so that the state estimate
at the control center is moved to a different price region from the true system
state.
On the other hand, if some lines are erroneously removed from or added to
the correct topology, as illustrated in Fig. 1.1(b), it affects the LMP calculation
to demand at each bus exists
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in three ways†. First, the state estimate is perturbed since the control center
employs an incorrect topology in state estimation. Secondly, the price partition
of the state space changes due to the errors in topology information. Third, the
shift matrix A in (2.1), which is a function of topology, changes thereby altering
prices attached to each price region.
2.2 Data Model and State Estimation
2.2.1 Meter data
In order tomonitor the system, various metermeasurements are collected in real
time, such as power injections, branch flows, voltage magnitudes, and phasors,
denoted by a vector z ∈ Rm. ‡ If there exists bad data a among the measurements,
the measurements with bad data, denoted by za, can be expressed as a function
of the system states x,
za = z + a = h(x) + w + a, a ∈ A, (2.4)
where w represents the random measurement noise.
We make a distinction here between the measurement noise and bad data;
the former accounts for random noise independently distributed across all me-
ters whereas the latter represents the perturbation caused by bad or malicious
†In addition to these, the change in topology will affect contingency analysis. Such effect will
appear as changes in contingency constraints in real-time LMP calculation (2.1) [52]. However,
dealing with contingency constraints will significantly complicate our analysis and possibly
obscure the more direct link between bad data and real-time LMP. Hence, we consider only line
congestion constraints in (2.1).
‡Notice here both conventional measurements and PMUmeasurements can be incorporated.
Although PMU data seem to have more direct impact on state estimation and real-time LMP
calculation, we won’t differentiate the types of measurements in the following discussion.
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data. We assume no specific pattern for bad data except that they do not hap-
pen everywhere. We assume that bad data can only happen in a subset of
the measurements, S. We call S as set of suspectable meters, which means
the meter readings with in S may subject to corruption. If the cardinality of
S is k, the feasible set of bad data a is a k-dimensional subspace, denoted as
A = {a : ai = 0 for all i < S}.
We will consider three bad data models with increasing power of affecting
state estimates.
M1. State independent bad data: This type of bad data is independent of real-
time measurements. Such bad data may be the replacement of missing mea-
surements.
M2. Partially adaptive bad data: This type of bad data may arise from the so-
called man in the middle (MiM) attack where an adversary intercepts the meter
data and alter the data based on what he has observed. Such bad data can adapt
to the system operating state.
M3. Fully adaptive bad data: This is the most powerful type of bad data, con-
structed based on the actual measurement z = h(x) + w.
Note that M3 is in general not realistic. Our purpose of considering this
model is to use it as a conservative proxy to obtain performance bounds for the
impact of worst case data.
We assume herein a DC model in which the measurement function h(·) in
(2.4) is linear. Specifically,
za = Hx + w + a, a ∈ A, (2.5)
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where H is the measurement matrix. Such a DC model, while widely used in
the literature, may only be a crude approximation of the real power system. By
making such a simplifying assumption and acknowledging its weaknesses, we
hope to obtain tractable solutions in searching for worst case scenarios. It is
important to note that, although the worst case scenarios are derived from the
DC model, we carry out simulations using the actual nonlinear system model.
2.2.2 Topology data
Topology data are represented by a binary vector s ∈ {0, 1}l, where each entry
of s represents the state of a line breaker (0 for open and 1 for closed). The bad
topology data is modeled as
sb = s + b (mod 2), b ∈ B, (2.6)
where B ⊂ {0, 1}l is the set of possible bad data. When bad data are present,
the topology processor will generate the topology estimate corresponding to sb,
and this incorrect topology estimate will be passed to the following operations
unless detected by the bad data detector.
2.2.3 State Estimation
We assume that the control center employs the standard weighted least squares
(WLS) state estimator. Under DC model,
xˆ = arg min
x
(z − Hx)TR−1(z − Hx) = Kz, (2.7)
where R is the covariance matrix of measurement noise w, and K ,
(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1.
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If the noise w is Gaussian, theWLS estimator is also the maximum likelihood
estimate (MLE) of state x. By the invariant property of MLE, from (2.3), the
maximum likelihood estimate of the branch flows is calculated as
ˆf = Fxˆ = FKz. (2.8)
The congestion pattern used in real-time LMP calculation (2.1) is directly
from state estimation and consists of all the estimated branch flows which are
larger than or equal to the branch flow limits, i.e.,
ˆC = { j : ˆf j ≥ T maxj }, (2.9)
where T maxj is the flow limit on branch j.
In the presence of bad meter data a, the meter measurements collected by
control center is actually za = Hx + w + a. By using za, the WLS state estimate is
xˆa = Kza = xˆ∗ + Ka, (2.10)
where xˆ∗ = Kz is the “correct” state estimate without the presence of the bad
data (i.e., a = 0).
Eq. (2.10) shows that the effect of bad data on state estimation is linear. How-
ever, because a is confined in a k-dimensional subspace A, the perturbation on
the actual system state is limited to a certain direction.
When bad data exist both in meter and topology data, the control center uses
a wrong measurement matrix ¯H, corresponding to the altered topology data,
and the altered meter data za. Then, the WLS state estimate becomes
xˆa = ¯Kza = ¯Kz + ¯Ka, (2.11)
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where ¯K , ( ¯HTR−1 ¯H)−1 ¯HTR−1. Note that unlike the linear effect of bad meter
data, bad topology data affects the state estimate by altering the measurement
matrix H to ¯H.
2.2.4 Bad Data Detection
The control center uses bad data detection to minimize the impact of bad data.
Here, we assume a standard bad data detection used in practice, the J(xˆ)-
detector in [23]. In particular, the J(xˆ)-detector performs the test on the residue
error, r , z − Hxˆ, based on the state estimate xˆ. From the WLS state estimate
(2.7), we have
r =
(
I − H(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1
)
z = Uz. (2.12)
where U ∆=(I − H(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1)
The J(xˆ)-detector is a threshold detector defined by
rTR−1r = zTWz
bad data
≷
good data
τ, (2.13)
where τ is the threshold calculated from a prescribed false alarm probability,
and W ∆=UTR−1U. When the measurement data fail to pass the bad data test,
the control center declares the existence of bad data and takes corresponding
actions to identify and remove the bad data.
In the following, we are interested in those cases when bad data are present
while the J(xˆ)-detector fails to detect them.
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2.3 Impact of Bad Data on LMP
In this section, we examine the impact of bad data on LMP, assuming that the
topology estimate of the network is correct.
One thing to notice is that in searching for the “worst” case, we take the
perspective of the control center, not that of the attacker. In particular, we look
for the worst congestion pattern for the LMP computation, even if this particular
congestion pattern is difficult for the attacker to discover. So the focus here is
not how easy it is for an attacker to find a locally worst congestion pattern; it is
how much such a congestion pattern affects the LMP.
2.3.1 Average Relative Price Perturbation
In order to quantify the effect of bad data on real-time price, we need to first
define the metric to measure the effect. We define the relative price perturbation
(RPP) as the expected percentage price perturbation caused by bad data. Given
that LMP varies at different buses, RPP also varies at different locations.
Let za be the data received at the control center and λi(za) the LMP at bus i.
The RPP at bus i is a function of bad data a, given by
RPPi(a) = E
(∣∣∣∣∣λi(za) − λi(z)λi(z)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
, (2.14)
where the expectation is over random state and measurement noise.
To measure the system-wide price perturbation, we define the average rela-
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tive price perturbation (ARPP) by
ARPP(a) = 1
n + 1
∑
i
RPPi(a), (2.15)
where n + 1 is the number of buses in the system.
The worst case analysis to be followed can be used for other metrics (e.g.,
price increase ratios or price decrease ratios, which are closely related to the
market participants’ gain or loss). Similar results can be showed following the
same strategies. However, the comparison among different metrics is beyond
the scope of our work.
2.3.2 Worst ARPP under State Independent Bad Data Model
First, we consider the state independent bad data model (M1) given in Sec-
tion 2.2.1. In this model, the bad data are independent of real-time measure-
ments.
In constructing the state independent worst data, it is useful to incorporate
prior information about the state. To this end, we assume that system state
follows a Gaussian distribution with mean x0, covariance matrix Σx. Typically,
we choose x0 as the day-ahead dispatch since the nominal system state in real-
time varies around its day-ahead projection.
In the presence of bad data a, the expected state estimate and branch flow
estimate on branch i are given by
E[xˆ] = x0 + Ka. (2.16)
E[ fi] = Fi·E[xˆ] = Fi·x0 + Fi·Ka, (2.17)
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where Fi· is the corresponding row of branch i in F.
Our strategy is to make this expected state estimate into the region with the
largest price perturbation among all the possible regions, ˆC∗. From (2.9), this
means making all the expected branch flows satisfy the boundary condition of
ˆC∗,
E[ fi] ≥ Tmaxi for i ∈ ˆC∗
E[ fi] ≤ Tmaxj for j < ˆC∗.
(2.18)
However, due to the uncertainty (from both system state x andmeasurement
noise w), the actual estimated state after attack, xˆ, may be different from E[xˆ].
Therefore, we want to make E[xˆ] at the “center” of the desired price region, i.e.,
maximizing the shortest distance from E[xˆ] to the boundaries of the polytope
price regions while still holding the boundary constraints. The shortest distance
can be calculated as
β = min{ ˜β : |E[ fi] − Tmax| ≥ ˜β for all i}. (2.19)
However, the existence of bad data detector prevents the bad data vector a
from being arbitrarily large. According to (2.12), the weighted squared residue
with a is
rTR−1r = zTa Wza = (w + a)TW(w + a). (2.20)
since WHx = 0
Heuristically, since w has zero mean, the term aTWa can be used to quantify
the effect of data perturbation on estimation residue. Then we use aTWa ≤ ǫ to
control the detection probability in the following optimization.
Therefore, for a specific congestion pattern ˆC, the adversary will solve the
following optimization problem to move the state estimate to the “center” of
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the price region ˆC and keeping the detection probability low.
maxa∈A, ˜β≥0 ˜β
subject to E[ fi] − ˜β ≥ Tmaxi , i ∈ ˆC
E[ fi] + ˜β < Tmaxj , j < ˆC
aTWa ≤ ǫ,
(2.21)
which is a convex program that can be solved easily in practice. We call a region
ˆC feasible if it makes problem (2.21) feasible.
Among all the feasible congestion patterns, the worst region ˆC∗ is chosen as
the one giving the largest ARPP.
ˆC∗ = arg max
ˆC∈Γ
| ˜λi − λi( ˆC)|, (2.22)
where ˜λi is the LMP at bus i if the x0 is the system state, and Γ the set of all the
feasible congestion patterns. Hence, the worst case constant bad data vector is
the solution to optimization problem (2.21) by setting the congestion pattern as
ˆC∗.
2.3.3 Worst ARPP under Partially Adaptive Bad Data
For bad data model M2, only part of the measurement values in real-time are
known to the adversary, denoted as zo. The adversary has to first make an es-
timation of the system state from the observation and prior distribution, then
make the attack decision based on the estimation result.
Without the presence of bad data vector, i.e., a = 0, the system equation (2.5)
gives
zo = Hox + wo, (2.23)
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where Ho is the rows of H corresponding to the observed measurements and wo
the corresponding part in the measurement noise w.
The minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimate of x given zo is given by
the conditional mean
E(x|zo) = x0 + ΣxHTo (HoΣxHTo )−1(zo − Hox0). (2.24)
Then, the flow estimate on branch i after attack is
E[ fi|zo] = Fi·E[xˆ|zo]. (2.25)
Still, we want to move the estimation of state to the “center”. On the other
hand, the expected measurement value E[za|zo] = HE[zˆ|zo] + a. Again, we need a
pre-designed parameter ǫ to control the detection probability. Therefore, the so-
lution to the following optimization problem is the best attack given congestion
pattern A
maxa∈A, ˜β≥0 ˜β
subject to E[ fi|zo] − ˜β ≥ Tmaxi , i ∈ ˆC
E[ fi|zo] + ˜β < Tmaxj , j < ˆC
(HE[za|zo]T)W(HE[za|zo]) ≤ ǫ.
(2.26)
This problem is also a convex optimization problem, which can be easily
solved. Among all the ˆC’s which make the above problem feasible, we choose
the one with the largest price perturbation, denoted as ˆC∗. The solution to prob-
lem (2.26) with ˆC∗ as the congestion pattern is the worst bad data vector.
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2.3.4 Worst ARPP under Fully Adaptive Bad Data
Finally, we consider the bad data model M3, in which the whole set of measure-
ments z is known to the adversary. The worst bad data vector depends on the
value of z. Different from the previous two models, with bad data vector a, the
estimated state is deterministic without uncertainty. In particular
xˆ = Kz + Ka. (2.27)
And the estimated flow on branch i after attack is also deterministic
ˆfi = Fi· xˆ = Fi·Kz + Fi·Ka. (2.28)
Similar to the previous two models, congestion pattern is called feasible if
there exists some bad data vector a to make the following conditions satisfied:
ˆfi ≥ Tmaxi , i ∈ ˆC
ˆfi < Tmaxj , j < ˆC
(z + a)TW(z + a) ≤ τ, a ∈ A.
(2.29)
Among all the feasible congestion patterns, we choose the one with the
largest price perturbation, ˆC∗. Any bad data vector a satisfying condition (2.29)
can serve as the worst fully adaptive bad data.
2.3.5 A Greedy Heuristic
The strategies presented above are based on the exhaustive search over all pos-
sible congestion patterns. Such approaches are not scalable for large networks
with a large number of possible congestion patterns. We now present a greedy
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heuristic approach aimed at reducing computation cost. In particular, we de-
velop a gradient like algorithm that searches among a set of likely congestion
patterns.
First, we restrict ourselves to the set of lines that are close to their respective
flow limits and look for bad data that will affect the congestion pattern. The
intuition is that it is unlikely that bad data can drive the system state sufficiently
far without being detected by the bad data detector. In practice, the cardinality
of such a set is usually very small compared with the systems size.
Second, we search for the worst data locally by changing one line in the con-
gestion pattern at a time. Specifically, suppose that a congestion pattern is the
current candidate for the worst data. Given a set of candidate lines that are
prone to congestions, we search locally by flipping one line at a time from the
congested state to the un-congested state and vice versa. If no improvement
can be made, the algorithm stops. Otherwise, the algorithm updates the cur-
rent “worst congestion pattern” and continue. The effectiveness of this greedy
heuristic is tested in Section 2.5.3.
2.4 Bad Topology Data on LMP
So far, we have considered bad data in the analogmeasurements. In this section,
we include the bad topology data, and describe another bad data model.
We represent the network topology by a directed graph G = (V,E) where
each i ∈ V denotes a bus and each (i, j) ∈ E denotes a connected transmission
line. For each physical transmission line (e.g., a physical line between i and j),
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we assign an arbitrary direction (e.g., (i, j)) for the line, and (i, j) is in E if and
only if bus i and bus j are connected.
Bad data may appear in both analog measurements and digital (e.g., breaker
status) data, as described in Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.2.2.
za = z + a = (Hx + w) + a, a ∈ A,
sb = s + b (mod 2), b ∈ B.
(2.30)
As in Section 2.3, we employ the adversary model to describe the worst case.
The adversary alters s to sb by adding b from the set of feasible attack vectors
B ⊂ {0, 1}l such that the topology processor produces the “target” topology ¯G as
the topology estimate. In addition, the adversary modifies z by adding a ∈ A
such that za looks consistent with ¯G.
In this section, we focus on the worst case when the adversary is able to alter
the network topology without changing the state estimate§. We also require that
such bad data are generated by an adversary causing undetectable topology
change, i.e., the bad data escape the system bad data detection. For the worst
case analysis, we will maximize the LMP perturbation among the attacks within
this specific class. Even though this approach is suboptimal, the simulation
results in Section 2.5 demonstrate that the resulting LMP perturbation is much
greater than the worst case of the bad meter data.
Suppose the adversary wants to mislead the control center with the target
topology ¯G = (V, ¯E), a topology obtained by removing¶ a set of transmission
§In general, the adversary can design the worst data to affect both the state estimate and
network topology. It is, however, much more difficult to make such attack undetectable.
¶Line addition by the adversary is also possible [33]. However, compared to line removal
attacks, line addition attacks require the adversary to observe a much larger set of meter mea-
surements to design undetectable attacks. In addition, the number of necessary modifications
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lines E∆ in G (i.e., ¯E = E \ E∆). We assume that the system with ¯G is observable:
i.e., the corresponding measurement matrix ¯H has full column rank‖.
The adversarial data modification aimed at perturbing the topology estimate
at the control center was studied in [34]. Suppose that the adversary changes the
breaker status such that the target topology ¯G = (V, ¯E) is observed at the control
center. Simultaneously, if the adversary introduces bad data a = ¯Hx − Hx, then
za = Hx + a + w = ¯Hx + w, (2.31)
which means that the meter data received at the control center are completely
consistent with the model generated from ¯G. Thus, any bad data detector will
not be effective.
It is of course not obvious how to produce the bad data a, especially when
the adversary can only modify a limited number of measurements, and it may
not have access to the entire state vector x. Fortunately, it turns out that a can be
generated by observing only a few entries in z without requiring global infor-
mation (such as the state vector x) [34].
A key observation is that Hx and ¯Hx differ only in a few entries correspond-
ing to the modified topology (lines in E∆) as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. Consider first
the noiseless case. Let zi j denote the entry of z corresponding to the flow mea-
surement from i to j. As hinted from Fig. 2.1, it can be easily seen that ¯Hx − Hx
has the following sparse structure [34]:
¯Hx − Hx = −
∑
(i, j)∈E∆
αi jm(i, j), (2.32)
in breaker data is also much larger: to make a line appear to be connected, the adversary should
make all the breakers on the line appear to be closed. Please see [34] for the detail.
‖Without observability, the system may not proceed to state estimation and real-time pric-
ing. Hence, for the adversary to affect pricing, the system with the target topology has to be
observable.
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Figure 2.1: Hx and ¯Hx: Each row is marked by the corresponding
meter (i for injection at i and (i, j) for flow from i to j).
where αi j ∈ R denotes the line flow from i to j when the line is connected and
the system state is x, and m(i, j) is the column of the measurement-to-branch inci-
dence matrix, that corresponds to (i, j): i.e., m(i, j) is an m-dimensional vector with
1 at the entries corresponding to the flow from i to j and the injection at i, and
−1 at the entries for the flow from j to i and the injection at j, and 0 at all other
entries. Absence of noise implies that zi j = αi j, which leads to
¯Hx − Hx = −
∑
(i, j)∈E∆
zi jm(i, j). (2.33)
With (2.33) in mind, one can see that setting a = ¯Hx − Hx and adding a to z is
equivalent to the following simple procedure: as described in Fig. 2.2, for each
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Attack-modified
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zi j z ji
z j zi − zi j
0 0
z j − z ji
Figure 2.2: The attack modifies local measurements around the line
(i, j) in E∆.
(i, j) in E∆,
1. Subtract zi j and z ji from zi and z j respectively.
2. Set zi j and z ji to be 0.
where zi is the entry of z corresponding to the injection measurement at bus i.
When measurement noise is present (i.e., z = Hx + w), the idea of the attack
is still the same: to make a approximate ¯Hx − Hx so that za is close to ¯Hx + w.
Since zi j = αi j + wi j, zi j is an unbiased estimate of αi j for each (i, j) ∈ E∆, and
this implies that −
∑
(i, j)∈E∆ zi jm(i, j) is an unbiased estimate of −
∑
(i, j)∈E∆ αi jm(i, j) =
¯Hx − Hx. Hence, we set a to be −
∑
(i, j)∈E∆ zi jm(i, j), the same as in the noiseless
setting, and the attack is executed by the same steps as above.
For launching this attack to modify the topology estimate from G to ¯G, the
adversary should be able to (i) set b such that the topology processor produces
¯G instead of G and (ii) observe and modify zi j, z ji, zi, and z j for all (i, j) ∈ E∆. The
attack is feasible if and only ifA andB contain the corresponding attack vectors.
To find the worst case LMP perturbation due to undetectable, state-
preserving attacks, let F denote the set of feasible ¯Gs, for which the attack can be
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launched with A and B. Among the feasible targets in F, we consider the best
target topology that results in the maximum perturbation in real-time LMPs. If
ARPP is used as a metric, the best target is chosen as
¯G∗[z] = arg max
¯G∈F
∑
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣
λi(z; ¯G) − λi(z;G)
λi(z;G)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (2.34)
where λi(z; ¯G) denotes the real-time LMP at bus i when the attack with the target
¯G is launched on z, and λi(z;G) is the real-time LMP under no attack.
2.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we demonstrate the impact of bad data on real-time LMPs with
the numerical simulations on IEEE-14 and IEEE-118 systems. We conducted
simulations in two different settings: the linear model with the DC state estima-
tor and the nonlinear model with the AC state estimator. The former is usually
employed in the literature for the ease of analysis whereas the latter represents
the practical state estimator used in the real-world power system. In all simula-
tions, the meter measurements consist of real power injections at all buses and
real power flows (both directions) at all branches.
2.5.1 Linear model with DC state estimation
We first present the simulation results for the linear model with the DC state
estimator. We modeled bus voltage magnitudes and phases as Gaussian ran-
dom variables with the means equal to the day-ahead dispatched values and
small standard deviations. In each Monte Carlo run, we generated a state real-
ization from the statistical model, and the meter measurements were created by
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the DCmodel with Gaussian measurement noise. Once the measurements were
created, bad data were added in the manners discussed in Section 2.3 and Sec-
tion 2.4. With the corrupted measurements, the control center executed the DC
state estimation and the bad data test with the false alarm probability constraint
0.1. If the data passed the bad data test, real-time LMPs were evaluated based
on the state estimation results. For IEEE-14 and IEEE-118 system, the network
parameters∗∗ are available in [4].
We used the number of meter data to be modified by the adversary as the
metric for the attack effort. For the 14 bus system, in each Monte Carlo run,
we randomly chose two lines, and the adversary was able to modify all the line
flow meters on the lines and injection meters located at the ends of the lines.
For the 118 bus system, we randomly chose three lines, and the adversary had
control over the associated line and injection meters. Both state and topology
attacks were set to control the same number of meter data†† so that we can fairly
compare their impacts on real-time LMPs. As for the meter data attack, we only
considered the lines that are close to their flow limits (estimated flows underM1
and M2, or actual flows under M3) as candidates for congestion pattern search.
The threshold is chosen as 10MW in our simulation.
∗∗In addition to the network parameters given in [4], we used the following line limit and
real-time offer parameters. In the IEEE-14 simulation, the generators at the buses 1, 2, 3, 6,
and 8 had capacities 330, 140, 100, 100, and 100 MW and the real-time offers 15, 31, 30, 10,
and 20 $/MW. Lines (2, 3), (4, 5), and (6, 11) had line capacities 50, 50, and 20 MW, and
other lines had no line limit. In the IEEE-118 simulation, the generators had generation costs
arbitrarily selected from {20, 25, 30, 35, 40 $/MW} and generation capacities arbitrarily selected
from {200, 250, 300, 350, 400MW}. Total 16 lines had the line capacities arbitrarily selected from
{70, 90, 110MW}, and other lines had no line limit. To handle possible occurrence of price spikes,
we set the upper and lower price caps as 500$/MW and -100$/MW respectively. Total 1000
Monte Carlo runs were executed for each case.
††Topology attacks need to make few additional modifications on breaker state data such that
the target lines appear to be disconnected to the topology processor. However, for simplicity,
we do not take into account this additional effort.
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Fig. 2.3 is the plot of ARPPs‡‡ versus detection probabilities of bad data. They
show that even when bad data were detected with low probability, ARPPs were
large, especially for the fully adaptive bad meter data and the bad topology
data.
Comparing ARPPs of the three bad meter data models, we observe that the
adversary may significantly improve the perturbation amount by exploiting
partial or all real-time meter data (for the partially adaptive case, the adver-
sary observed a half of all meters.) It is worthy to point out that bad topology
data result in much greater price perturbation than bad meter data.
Recall the discussion in Section 2.1 and Section 2.4 that bad topology data
and bad meter data employ different price-perturbing mechanisms: bad topol-
ogy data perturb real-time LMP by restructuring the price regions without per-
turbing the state estimate (the line-removal attack introduced in Section 2.4 does
not perturb state estimate) whereas bad meter data perturb real-time LMP by
simply moving the state estimate to a different price region. Therefore, the ob-
servation implies that restructuring the price regions has much greater impact
on real-time LMP than merely perturbing the state estimate.
2.5.2 Nonlinear model with AC state estimation
The simulations with the nonlinearmodel intend to investigate the vulnerability
of the real-world power system to the worst adversarial act, designed based on
the linear model. The simulations were conducted on IEEE-14 and IEEE-118
‡‡The detection probabilities for the fully adaptive bad meter data and the bad topology data
cases were less than 0.1 in all the simulations. In the figures, we draw ARPPs of those cases as
horizontal lines so that we can compare them with other cases.
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(a) IEEE-14: ARPP of the worst topology data is 66.1%.
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(b) IEEE-118: ARPP of the worst topology data is 22.4%.
Figure 2.3: Linear model: ARPP vs detection prob.
systems in the same manner as the linear case except that we employed the
nonlinear model and the AC state estimation.
Fig. 2.4 is the plot of ARPPs versus detection probabilities. The result shows
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that the proposed methodology can affect the system to some extent even when
nonlinear estimator is used, especially when the bad data are present in the
topology data, although the nonlinear estimator makes this effect relatively less
significant compared with the linear case results.
Although using nonlinear state estimation seems “unfair” to the proposed
strategies, since they are all designed based on DC model, we want to empha-
size two aspects here by using the simulation results. On one hand, the effects
of these DC based strategies are mitigated due to the high complexity of the
nonlinear model and hence the detailed structure of the nonlinear system needs
to be explored; on the other hand, even though the actual nonlinear model is
used, the topology attack can still achieve a very good performance.
2.5.3 Performance of the greedy search heuristic
We also conducted simulation based on the proposed greedy search technique
in Section 2.3.5. The simulation was based on 118 bus system, and all param-
eters were the same as those presented in Section 2.5.1. We compared the per-
formance and computation time of the greedy heuristics with exhaustive search
benchmark, as shown in Table 2.1. Notice here the exhaustive search and greedy
search are both over the lines that are close to their flow limits (estimated flows
under M1 and M2, or actual flows under M3), the same as in Section 2.5.1. In
Table 2.1, the second column (average search time) is the average searching time
for worst congestion pattern over 1000 Monte Carlo runs, and the third column
(accuracy) is the percentage that the greedy search find the same worst conges-
tion pattern as the exhaustive search. From the result, we can see that using
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Figure 2.4: Nonlinear model: ARPP vs detection prob.
greedy heuristic can give us much faster processing algorithm without losing
much of the accuracy.
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Table 2.1: Performance of greedy search method
method average search time accuracy
exhaustive search 1.23s 100%
greedy search 0.51s 97.3%
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CHAPTER 3
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ELECTRICITY RETAILER AND
CONSUMERS
3.1 Stackelberg game model
We formulate the DAHP scheme as a Stackelberg game model [22]. Particularly,
the retailer is the leader who makes decision first while the consumers are the
followers who make decision after observing the leader’s action. The action
sequence in DAHP is as follows:
1. The retailer offers the consumers the day-ahead hourly retail price, tak-
ing into account the statistics of real-time wholesale market and consumer
response.
2. In real-time, a consumer dynamically determines her energy consump-
tion. The payment from a consumer to the retailer is settled as the product
of the day-ahead hourly price and the real-time energy consumption.
3. The retailer meets aggregated demand by purchasing electricity at the
wholesale market, possibly complemented by its own (renewable) gen-
eration resources.
The Stackelberg game can be solved via backward induction. We thus
present first the analysis of optimal demand response to a fixed day-ahead
hourly price vector, π. Then, the problem of optimizing π from the retailer’s
point of view is considered.
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3.1.1 Consumer action: optimal demand response
Under the DAHP scheme, after the day-ahead hourly price vector π is given, a
consumer can fully determine her own energy consumption in real time to op-
timize the consumer surplus (i.e., the difference between consumer utility and
retail electricity payment). With the help of home energy management devices,
the consumer can adopt optimal control policy and the corresponding demand
response can be viewed as the predicted behavior of a rational consumer in the
Stackelberg game described above.
According to [2], the U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that
most of the residential electricity usage comes from space heating and air con-
ditioning. Therefore, we assume that the price elastic demand comes primarily
from the control of a certain HVAC unit that maintains the indoor temperature
at a certain desirable setting andwe also specialize a particular thermal dynamic
model involving an HVAC temperature control.
Let π = (π1, · · · , π24) be the DAHP vector where πi is the day-ahead price for
the ith hour and x = (x1, ..., x24) be the vector of average indoor temperatures
for each hour. Empirical study [9] has shown that the dynamic equation that
governs the temperature evolution is given by
xi = xi−1 + α(ai − xi−1) − βpi + wi, (3.1)
where a = (a1, a2, ..., a24) is the vector of average outdoor temperatures in each
hour, p = (p1, ..., p24) the vector of control variable representing the total amount
of electricity drawn by the HVAC unit during each hour and w = (w1,w2, ...,w24)
the process noise with zero mean. System parameters α (0 < α < 1) and β
model the insolation of the building and efficiency of the HVAC unit. Note
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that the above equation applies to both heating and cooling scenarios but not
simultaneously. We focus herein the cooling scenario (β > 0) and the results
apply to heating (β < 0) as well.
To observe the state x and control the HVAC unit, temperature measure-
ments need to be collected. We assume that thermometers are installed for both
indoor and outdoor temperatures. The measurement equation is given by
yi = (xi, ai) + vi, (3.2)
where vi is the vector of measurement noise.
For a particular consumer j, assume that at hour i, she wants to keep the in-
door temperature close to her own desired temperature t( j)i . In the following, we
will use superscript ( j) to denote the variable associated with consumer j. The
deviation of the actual indoor temperature x( j)i from desired temperature t
( j)
i can
be used to measure the consumer j’s uncomfort level. By assuming symmetric
upward and downward discomfort, a quadratic form of consumer utility as a
function of indoor temperature x( j) is given by
u( j) = −µ( j)
24∑
i=1
(x( j)i − t( j)i )2, (3.3)
where µ( j) is a consumer j’s own weight factor to convert the squared temper-
ature deviation to a monetary value. Note that the state variable x( j) is affected
by the HVAC energy consumption vector p( j).
On the other hand, given the retail price π and the consumers’ responsive
demand p( j), the real-time payment of energy consumption from the consumer
to the retailer is settled as
∑24
i=1 πi p
( j)
i . Therefore, the consumer surplus, cs
( j)(π, ω),
can be defined as the difference between the consumer utility and total payment
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from the consumer j to the retailer, as shown below. Hereafter, we use ω to
indicate random variables and vectors.
cs( j)(π, ω)∆=u( j) − πTp( j). (3.4)
As our assumption, a rational consumer will dynamically manage her en-
ergy consumption to maximize the consumer surplus in real time according to
π and current state. Therefore, the solution to the following stochastic control
program serves as the optimal residential demand response to DAHP.
maxp( j) E
{∑24
i=1[−µ( j)(x( j)i − ti)2] − πTp( j)
}
s.t. x( j)i = x
( j)
i−1 + α
( j)(ai − x( j)i−1) − β( j) p( j)i + w( j)i
y( j)i = (x( j)i , ai) + v( j)i .
(3.5)
Under mild conditions where the price doesn’t vary too much during a day
and µ is large, we ignore the positive constraint and rate constraint for energy
consumption p( j) for computation convenience. With this simplification, the op-
timization problem (3.5) is similar to the standard linear quadratic Gaussian
(LQG) problem where the costs on the control and states are both quadratic.
Soving the problem by backward induction will give the optimal demand re-
sponse as shown in the following theorem [29].
Theorem 2 Under DAHP scheme and the assumption that solutions to (3.5) are all
positive for all consumers, the optimal aggregated residential demand response for a
fixed retail price π has the following affine form,
d(π, ω) = −Gπ + b(ω), (3.6)
where G is a deterministic and positive definite matrix, depending only on the dynamic
system parameters.
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Proof 2 For consumer j, the optimal control is given as,
p∗( j)i =
1
β
(
xˆ
( j)
i−1|i−1 + α
( j)(aˆi|i−1 − xˆ( j)i−1|i−1) − x∗( j)i
)
,
x
∗( j)
i
∆
=
πi−(1−α( j))πi−1
2µ( j)β( j) + t
( j)
i ,
where xˆ( j)i−1|i−1 and aˆi|i−1 are the ML estimated indoor and outdoor temperatures of hour
i at hour i − 1, π25 is assumed to be 0, and x∗( j)i is an ancillary value. Expanding the
solution above, we will have the total demand of consumer j is
d( j) = p( j) + p˜( j) = −G( j)π + c( j) + p˜( j),
where c( j) is a random variable and independent of π, p˜( j) is the price inelastic demand
from consumer j and G( j) satisfies
G( j)ik =

[1 + (1 − α( j))2]/[2µ(β( j))2] if i = k , 1
1/[2µ(β( j))2] if i = k = 1
(−1 + α( j))/[2µ(β( j))2] if |i − k| = 1
0 o.w.
Notice thatG( j) is deterministic and diagonal dominant with positive diagonal elements.
Hence, G(k) is positive definite. On the other hand, the aggregated demand
p(π, ω) =
∑
k
d( j) = −Gπ + b(ω),
where b(ω) = ∑ j(c( j) + p˜( j)), G = ∑ j G( j). G is positive definite and deterministic,
depending only on the dynamic system parameters.
Theorem 2 establishes an affine relationship between the optimal demand
response and day-ahead hour price under some mild conditions. It is shown
that the sensitivity matrix of demand with respect to price, −G, is not affected
by the realization of randomness. This means that the change of price will have
deterministic effect on the expected value of demand.
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The result will guide our following calculation of the retailer’s decision. The
properties that the relationship is affine and G is positive definite are important
to our later discussion.
3.1.2 Retailer action: optimal dynamic pricing
In the following, we assume that the retailer is a price taker in the whole-
sale market. This means that aggregated demand from the consumers would
not affect the wholesale price in real time. Additionally, we assume that the
Stackelberg game discussed in this chapter is with perfect information, which
means that the form of the followers’ (consumers’) payoff function is completely
known to the leader (retailer).
In real-time, the retailer is required to keep the balance of the power flow
and provide aggregated demand to the consumers. No curtailment is permit-
ted. To deliver energy, the retailer has to pay for the retail cost, including the
distribution loss, the real-time payment to the wholesale market, and etc..
Let λ(ω) = (λ1(ω), λ2(ω), ..., λ24(ω)) denote the random vector of average per
unit retail cost during each hour. We assume there is no correlation between the
demand response and the retail cost in the following. Therefore, without self-
owned generation, the total daily retail profit rp(π, ω), defined as the difference
between the real-time retail revenue and the retail cost, is as follows,
rp(π, ω) = πTd(π, ω) − (λ(ω))Td(π, ω). (3.7)
The retailer’s pricing decision depends on its own payoff function. If the re-
tailer only focuses on the expected retail profit, as in amonopoly retail structure,
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the solution to the following problem is the optimal pricing strategy.
maxπ rp(π) = (π − ¯λ)T(−Gπ + ¯b), (3.8)
where bar is used to represent the expected value, also in the following part
of this chapter. As shown in Theorem 2, G is positive definite. Therefore, the
problem is a convex program and can be easily solved.
However, as a load serving entity, the retailer needs to also take into consid-
eration its consumers’ satisfaction measured by the consumer surplus. Given
the retail price π, by replacing the optimal demand response in Theorem 2 back
into the consumer optimization problem, the expected aggregated consumer
surplus can be expressed as
cs(π) = ∑ j cs( j)(π)
=
∑
j
∑24
i=1[−µ(x∗( j)i − ti)2] − ( ¯d( j))Tπ
= πTGπ/2 − πT ¯b + c,
(3.9)
where x∗( j) and d( j) are the same as the values in the proof of Theorem 2 in the
Appendix, and c is a constant depending on the variance of the noise.
The other extreme payoff function the retailer may take is the expected social
welfare. Formally, the expected social welfare, sw(π), can be defined as the sum
of consumer surplus and retail profit, i.e.,
sw(π) = rp(π) + cs(π). (3.10)
The social welfare reflects the combined benefit of the consumers and the
retailer. Maximizing the expected social welfare, we can get the following theo-
rem.
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Theorem 3 The optimal retail price πsw that maximizes the social welfare is the ex-
pected real-time retail cost, i.e.,
πsw = ¯λ,
and the expected retail profit under πsw is
rp(πsw) = 0.
For any π′ such that rp(π′) ≥ 0, we have cs(π′) ≤ cs(πsw).
Proof 3 Setting the derivative of sw(π) to zero gives the optimal price and resulted
retail profit as,
πsw = ¯λ, rp(πsw) = 0.
For any π′ such that rp(π′) ≥ 0, we have
cs(π′) = sw(π′) − rp(π′) ≤ sw(πsw) − 0 = cs(πsw).
Theorem 3 shows that, if the social welfare is to be maximized, the retailer
generates no profit. This result is consistent with the situation when there is
perfect competition among identical retailers, in which case, social welfare max-
imization leads to zero profit. It is also shown that when social welfare is the
payoff function, the retailer simply matches the DAHP with the expected real-
time retail cost.
3.2 Analysis of equilibria: achievable tradeoff
In this section, we will solve the Stackelberg game with a general form of the
retailer’s payoff function and establish the trade-off between consumer surplus
(CS) and retail profit (RP).
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As a load serving entity, the utility needs to take into consideration its own
profit and consumers’ satisfaction measured by the consumer surplus. In partic-
ular, we consider a weighted social welfare in expectation defined as a weighted
sum of consumer surplus and retail profit, i.e.,
max {rp(π) + ηcs(π)}, (3.11)
where η is the retailer’s preference weight on the consumer surplus. If η = 1,
this is equivalent to optimizing the social welfare. If η = 0, this is the same as
optimizing the retail profit. When η < 0, the retailer can benefit from reducing
the consumer’s surplus. On the other side, when η > 1, the retailer will reduce
its own profit (maybe to negative) to achieve better payoff comparing with the
social welfare maximization case. Therefore, a rational retailer should choose η
between [0, 1] andwewill not consider those η’s beyond [0, 1] which don’t make
economic sense for the retailer.
An alternative formulation is based on the optimal CS-RP trade-offs. In
particular, we are interested in characterizing the Pareto front involving
(cs(π), rp(π)). A point on the Pareto front can be obtained by considering a prac-
tical situation where the retailer optimizes its profit with the constraint that the
consumer surplus no less than a certain level. In particular, the problem is for-
mulated as
max rp(π)
s.t. cs(π) ≥ τ.
(3.12)
From the above optimization, the Pareto front can be traced by varying the
consumer surplus level. Comparing the formulation (3.11) and 3.12), we have
the following theorem.
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Theorem 4 For any specific η, if the solution in (3.11) is π∗, π∗ is also a solution to
(3.12) with τ = cs(π∗). Varying τ in optimization (3.12) and varying η in optimization
(3.11) will give the same trade-off curve between expected retail profit and expected
consumer surplus.
Proof 4 With a particular η, assume π∗ is a solution to (3.11). Let τ = cs(π∗) in (3.12).
Then π∗ will be in the feasible set of (3.11). If there exists π′, such that rp(π′) > rp(π∗),
and cs(π′) ≥ τ,
rp(π′) + ηcs(π′) > rp(π∗) + ητ = rp(π∗) + ηcs(π∗).
Hence, π∗ is not the solution to (3.11) since π′ achieves better objective value. It contra-
dicts with the assumption. Therefore, π∗ is also a solution to (3.12).
Theorem 4 implies that the two optimization problems are equivalent and
give the same Pareto front. Each point on the Pareto front is attainable and cor-
responds to a equilibrium point in the Stackelberg game with particular payoff
function. The shape of the trade-off region is characterized by the following
theorem.
Theorem 5 The Pareto front of (cs, rp) is concave and decreasing. The area above the
Pareto front is infeasible for the retailer to achieve under DAHP.
Proof 5 For η ∈ [0, 1], the solution to (3.11) is given by
π∗ =
1
2 − η
G−1[(1 − η)¯b +G ¯λ].
Define the resulted retail profit and consumer surplus as
rp∗(η)∆=rp(π∗(η)), cs∗(η)∆=cs(π∗(η)).
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Numerical calculation shows that,
∂rp∗(η)
∂cs∗(η) =
∂rp∗(η)
∂η
∂cs∗(η)
∂η
= −η.
cs∗(η) is an increasing function of η. Therefore, ∂rp∗(η)
∂cs∗(η) decreases as cs
∗(η) increases. The
curve is concave. According to Theorem 4, rp∗(η) is the optimal value of (3.12) when
consumer surplus is at least cs∗(η). Therefore, no CS-RP pair can be above the trade-off
curve.
Some well known pricing strategies can be placed on the Pareto front, as
shown in Fig. 1.2. The social welfare maximizing pricing πsw is located on the CS
axis. This is from Theorem 3 and also intuitive since maximizing social welfare
dictates the removal of retail profit. The optimal regulated monopoly price πr is
located at the Pareto front where the retailer profit has a regulated profit margin,
∆. πo is the price when the retailer’s objective is purely maximizing its profit,
which is the leftmost point on the trade-off curve.
3.3 Effect of renewable energy
With the integration of renewable energy, the characteristics of the interaction
between the retailer and the consumers will be changed, i.e., the CS-RP trade-
off curve will be shifted. However, the effect depends on whether the renewable
energy is utility-based or consumer-based.
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3.3.1 Effect of utility-based wind integration
We consider in this subsection the role of renewable energy owned by the re-
tailer. As a large load aggregator, the retailer may have the financial ability and
incentive to have its ownwind farm or have contract with other wind farms. We
now consider a scenario that the retailer has access to wind power which can be
used to compensate the real-time loads from the consumers. We assume that
the usage of the wind farm is completely for serving the local area, and excess
wind power will be spilled by the retailer.
In practice, the marginal cost of wind power is almost negligible. For sim-
plicity, in the following we assume zero cost of using wind power in real time
and use a random vector, q(ω) = (q1(ω), ..., q24(ω)), to denote the wind power
available for the retailer in each hour. Therefore, the retailer’s profit after wind
power integration is in the form of
rpw(π, ω) = πTd(π, ω) − λ(ω)T(d(π, ω) − q(ω))+, (3.13)
where function (x)+ is the positive part of x, defined as (x)+ ∆=max{x, 0}.
Following a similar discussion as in the Section 3.2, we focus on the problem
that the retailer’s payoff function is a linear combination of retail profit and
consumer surplus. Notice here the consumer surplus does not change while the
retail profit is replaced by rpw(π, ω), where the preference weight on consumer
surplus is denoted as η ∈ [0, 1]. Varying η and maximizing the weighted social
welfare rpw(π) + ηcs(π) will give the CS-RP trade-off curve with utility-based
wind power.
By incorporating free wind power, intuitively the CS-RP trade-off curve will
be enlarged towards upright on the CS-RP plane. The following theorem ver-
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ifies this intuition and also shows how the benefit of wind integration is dis-
tributed between the retailer and the consumers.
Theorem 6 Assume that for each hour i, the available wind power is uniformly dis-
tributed over [0, K], where K denotes the maximum capacity. For a particular preference
parameter η, let the optimal demand level before wind integration in the optimization
(3.11) be d(η) and the optimal price after wind integration be πηw. Define ∆rp(η) and
∆cs(η) as the increase of retail profit and consumer surplus after wind integration.
Then we have,
1. The retail profit change is always positive, i.e., ∆rpw(πηw) > 0 for all η.
2. When K ≤ mini∈{1,...,24} di(η), ∆cs(η) = 0. Otherwise, ∆cs(η) > 0.
3. As K goes to ∞, the fraction of wind integration benefit to the consumer side,
∆cs(η)
∆cs(η)+∆rp(η) , goes to
1
3−2η .
Proof 6 Before wind integration, for a particular η, the first order condition gives that
the optimal demand level d(η) satisfies
b − (2 − η)d(η) = Gλ.
After wind integration, for a particular η, the first order condition gives that the optimal
demand level dw(η) satisfies
b − (2 − η)dw(η) = G(λ ◦ F(dw(η))),
where ◦ means the Hadamard product, i.e., piecewise product of two vectors, and F is
the cdf of wind power distribution.
When K < mini di(η), we can see that d(η) satisfies the optimal condition therefore
dw(η) = d(η), ∆cs(η) = 0. Otherwise, dw(η) = d(η) + Gδ/(2 − η), where δ = λ − λ ◦
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F(dw(η)) ≥ 0, and δ is not zero since d(η) does not satisfy the optimal condition after
wind integration.
∆cs(η) = 12{(dw(η))TG−1dw(η) − (d(η))TG−1d(η)}
=
1
2{2δ
Td(η) + δTGδ} > 0.
For the RP, for all K and η,
∆rp(η) = (1 − η){(dw(η))TG−1dw(η) − (d(η))TG−1d(η)}
+
1
2K {(dw(η))TΛdw(η)} > 0,
where Λ = diag(¯λ1, ... ¯λ24). As K goes to infinity, dw(η) is bounded, ∆rp(η) goes to
(1 − η){(dw(η))TG−1dw(η) − (d(η))TG−1d(η)}, ∆cs(η) equals to 12{(dw(η))TG−1dw(η) −
(d(η))TG−1d(η)}, then ∆cs(η)
∆cs(η)+∆rp(η) goes to
1
3−2η .
In Theorem 6, it is shown that the retail profit change with wind power in-
tegration is always positive. In particular, for social welfare maximization, the
retailer profit is positive and the corresponding point is economically viable.
Theorem 6 also shows that the benefit of wind integration all goes to the re-
tailer side when the capacity is small. As the capacity of wind farm is larger
than a certain threshold, the fraction of the wind integration benefit to the con-
sumer side becomes positive. When the capacity goes to infinity, this fraction
converges to a particular limit, 13−2η , depending only on the retailer’s preference
weight η over the consumer surplus.
The convergence limit in Theorem 6 implies that when the retailer is purely
a “profit seeker”, the fraction of wind integration to demand side converges to
1
3 . On the other hand, if the retailer’s objective is social welfare maximization,
as the capacity of wind power goes to infinity, the fraction of renewable integra-
tion benefit to consumers converges to 1, which means that the retail profit will
converge to zero.
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3.3.2 Effect of consumer-based renewable integration
On the other hand, the consumers may also have access to renewable energy,
e.g., solar energy. Nowadays, residential solar panels are widely used and so-
lar energy can be viewed as an important substitute for the electricity purchased
directly from the retailer. In the following, wewill study the effects of consumer-
based solar energy and denote it as a 24-dimensional random nonnegative vec-
tor, s(ω) = (s1(ω), s2(ω), ..., s24(ω)), with the mean s¯. Under DAHP structure, the
consumer’s optimization problem (3.5) is changed to
p,r
max E
{∑N
i=1[−µ(xi − ti)2] − πT(u − s)
}
s.t. xi = xi−1 + α(ai − xi−1) − βui + wi,
yi = (xi, ai) + vi
(3.14)
Following the same backward induction in Theorem 2, we can see that given
the same day-ahead price π, the HVAC energy usage u will not change, while
the aggregated demand ds(π, ω) has the form,
ds(π, ω) = b(ω) − s(ω) − Gπ. (3.15)
Accordingly, the expected consumer surplus with solar energy is changed to
css(π) = cs(π) + πT s¯, and the retail profit rps(π) = rp(π) − (π − ¯λ)T s¯. With different
preference weight on consumer surplus, η ∈ [0, 1], maximizing the retail payoff
function, rps(π)+ηcss(π), will give us the CS-RP tradeoff curve with utility-based
solar energy. The following theorem characterizes the shape of the new trade-off
curve.
Theorem 7 Denote the social welfare and retail profit maximization price as πos and
πsws , respectively.
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1. The social welfare maximization price is ¯λ, and the resulted retail profit, rps(¯λ)
is 0. The corresponding social welfare maximization point (css(πsws ), rps(πsws )) is
outside the original CS-RP trade-off curve without solar energy.
2. The maximized retail profit rps(πos)) is smaller than the maximized retail profit
without consumer-based solar energy.
3. As s¯ increases, the maximized social welfare increases and the maximized retail
profit decreases.
Proof 7 When η = 1, the retailer’s payoff function is social welfare,
sws(π) = sw(π) + ¯λT s¯. (3.16)
Therefore, the social welfare maximization price will be the same as in Theorem 3, ¯λ, and
the resulted retail profit, rps(¯λ) is still 0. Since ¯λT s¯ > 0, the social welfare maximiza-
tion point, (0, sws(¯λ)), will be outside the original CS-RP trade-off curve without solar
energy.
When η = 1, the retailer’s payoff function is retail profit, and the optimal price is
calculated as
πos =
1
2
(G−1 ¯b − G−1 s¯ + ¯λ). (3.17)
The retail profit change with solar energy is
∆rp = −1
2
(G−1b − λ)T s¯, (3.18)
Since G−1b is the price to make demand equal to zero, G−1b − λ ≥ 0. Therefore,
∆rp < 0. The maximized profit decreases.
Also, the maximized RP decreases with the increase of solar energy level s¯.
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Theorem 7 shows that on the left side of the CS-RP trade-off curve, the max-
imized profit with solar energy is less than previous maximized profit and the
CS-RP pairs with solar energy are below the original trade-off curve. While on
the right side, the social welfare maximization point with solar energy is out-
side the original trade-off curve. Therefore, two CS-RP trade-off curves, with
and without solar energy, will cross with each other. Let’s assume the cross
point is (cs∗, rp∗).
First we consider the case that the original operating point on the trade-off
curve is to the left of (cs∗, rp∗). After incorporating solar energy, either the re-
tailer can no longer have the retail profit as much as before or the consumer
surplus has to be reduced to maintain the same amount of retail profit. There-
fore, the retail market will suffer loss even though solar energy is provided.
On the other hand, if the original operating point on the trade-off curve is
to the right of (cs∗, rp∗), the consumer surplus will increase if the retail profit
remains the same. The retail market benefits from consumer-based solar energy.
These results are illustrated by simulations in Section 3.5.4.
3.4 Effect of storage
With the development of energy storage technology, either the retailer and the
consumers may install storage devices, which can help to reschedule the en-
ergy usage and result in better payoff. Similar to Section 3.3, these two cases
also have significantly different characteristics. In the following, we will study
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the effects of utility-based and consumer-based storage on the CS-RP trade-off
curves separately.
3.4.1 Effect of utility-based storage
Firstly, we consider the role of storage on the utility side. For hour i, denote
the energy level in the battery as Bi and the energy charged into the battery as
ri (when ri ≤ 0, it means discharging the battery). We use r+i ≥ 0 and r−i ≥ 0 to
represent the positive and negative part of ri, i.e., ri = r+i −r−i . Then the dynamics
of the battery can be expressed as
Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr+i − r−i /ρ). (3.19)
where κ ∈ (0, 1) is the storage efficiency, τ ∈ (0, 1) the charging efficiency and
ρ ∈ (0, 1) the discharging efficiency.
Given the day-ahead price, π, the demand side optimization (3.5) will not
change and the optimal demand is still a linear function of π as in (3.6). On the
other hand, by using storage, the retailer can take advantage of hourly varying
retail cost, λ, to achieve better profit. Formally, assuming the storage size is
smaller than the demand, the retail profit with utility-based storage, rprb(π), can
be expressed as,
rbrb(π) =
r,B
max πT ¯d − ¯λT( ¯d + r)
s.t. ¯d = ¯b − Gπ
Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr+i − r−i /ρ)
B24 = B0, 0 ≤ Bi ≤ C
0 ≤ r+i ≤ ru, 0 ≤ r−i ≤ rd
(3.20)
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where B0 is the initial energy level in the storage, C the capacity of the battery,
ru the charging limit, and rd the discharging limit.
Notice that rprb(π) can be expressed as sum of the original retail profit, rp(π),
and the arbitrage profit Q(¯λ), i.e., rprb(π) = rp(π) + Q(¯λ), where Q is defined as,
Q(¯λ)∆=
r,B
max −¯λTr
s.t. Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr+i − r−i /ρ)
B24 = B0, 0 ≤ Bi ≤ C
0 ≤ r+i ≤ ru, 0 ≤ r−i ≤ rd
(3.21)
With the preference weight parameter on consumer surplus η, the retailer’s
payoff function is
rprb(π) + ηcs(π) = rp(π) + ηcs(π) + Q(λ). (3.22)
Therefore, for any η, the optimal price for the retailer is the same as in the
case without storage, and the CS-RP trade-off curve is parallelly shifted up by
Q(¯λ).
3.4.2 Effect of consumer-based storage
Then, we consider the effects of consumer-based storage. In particular, we as-
sume the net-metering option where a consumer can, in effect, sell back excess
energy. In the presence of storage, a consumer can take advantage of the hourly
varying day-ahead retail price.
Using the the same notation for storage as in Section 3.4.1, the optimal de-
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mand response problem on the consumer side (3.5) is changed to
p,r,B
max E
{∑N
i=1[−µ(xi − ti)2] − πT(p + r)
}
s.t. xi = xi−1 + α(ai − xi−1) − βpi + wi,
yi = (xi, ai) + vi
Bi+1 = κ(Bi + τr+i − r−i /ρ)
B24 = B0, 0 ≤ Bi ≤ C
0 ≤ r+i ≤ ru, 0 ≤ r−i ≤ rd
(3.23)
Under the net-metering assumption (see [70] for more general results), we
can see that the optimization problem can be divided into two independent sub
problems, where the first one is the same as the previous optimal stochastic
HVAC control (3.5) and the second one is purely energy arbitrage. This means
that adding storage on the demand side doesn’t change the original linear rela-
tionship between the actual HVAC consumption and retail price; the benefit of
storage goes the consumer side in the form of arbitrage options.
Therefore, given day-ahead price π, denote r(π) as the optimal charging vec-
tor, i.e., the solution to getting Q(π) as in (3.21). Correspondingly, the consumer
surplus with consumer-based storage is cscb(π) = cs(π) + Q(π), and the retail
profit with consumer-based storage is rpcb(π) = rp(π) − Q(π) − ¯λTr(π) assuming
the aggregated storage size is smaller than demand. By varying η ∈ [0, 1], maxi-
mizing the retail payoff function will give us the tradeoff curve between CS and
RP with consumer-based storage.
The following theorem characterizes the shape of the new CS-RP trade-off
curve with consumer-based storage.
Theorem 8 Denote the social welfare and retail profit maximization price as πo
cb
and
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πsw
cb
, respectively.
1. The social welfare maximization price is ¯λ, and the resulted retail profit, rpcb(¯λ)
is 0. The corresponding social welfare maximization point (cscb(πswcb ), rpcb(πswcb )) is
outside the original CS-RP trade-off curve without storage.
2. The maximized profit rpcb(πswcb )) is less than the original maximized profit if B
is small enough and Q(π˜) > 3Q(¯λ), where π˜ = G−1b, which is the cut-off price
resulting in zero demand.
3. Assuming the same storage parameters, the CS-RP trade-off curve with
consumer-based storage is always inside the trade-off curve with utility-based
storage.
Proof 8 When the preference weight factor on consumer surplus η = 1, the retailer’s
payoff function is social welfare. Notice that
rpcb(¯λ) = rpcb(¯λ) + cscb(¯λ)
= rp(¯λ) + cs(¯λ) + Q(¯λ)
≥ rp(π) + cs(π) − ¯λTr(π),
(3.24)
for any π, which means that the social welfare maximization price is ¯λ, resulted retail
profit is 0, and the maximized social welfare is increased by Q(λ). Therefore, the social
welfare maximization point is outside the original trade-off curve.
When the preference weight factor η = 0, the retailer’s payoff function is retail profit.
With the consumer-based storage, the consumer surplus increases by Q(πo
cb
), while the
retail profit is changed by Q(πo
cb
)− ¯λTr(πo
cb
)). We know Q(π) is a piecewise linear function
of π. Therefore,
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Q(πo
cb
) = Q((π˜ + ¯λ)/2 + ∆π)
≥ Q(π˜)/2 −maxπ(−¯λTr(π))/2 −maxπ(−(∆π)Tr(π))
≥ Q(¯λ) + (Q(π˜) − 3Q(¯λ))/2 −maxπ(−(∆π)Tr(π))
(3.25)
According to the assumption Q(π˜) > 3Q(¯λ)), when the storage size is small enough
to make ∆π small enough, Q(πo
cb
) > Q(¯λ). The retail profit decreases. We have the
maximized profit decreased when the storage size is small.
For a particular η, assume the optimal price with consumer-based storage is πcb(η).
Using the same price for the case of utility-based storage. The change of social welfare
is Q(¯λ) − (−¯λTr(πcb(η)) ≥ 0. The corresponding point has decreased consumer surplus
and increased retail profit. Since all the left points have less social welfare, this point
is outside the trade-off curve with consumer-based storage. On the other hand, πcb(η)
is a feasible price for the case with utility-based storage and the corresponding point is
inside the trade-off curve with utility-based storage. Therefore, the utility-based storage
results in a trade-off curve completely outside the one with consumer-based storage. 
Theorem 8 shows that maximized retail profit with consumer-based storage
decreases while the maximized social welfare increases, comparing with the
case without storage. Therefore, the new trade-off curve is inside the original
curve on the left side and outside the original curve on the right side; the two
curves will cross with each other. This means that only when the preference η
chosen by the retailer is larger than the one for the cross point, the consumer-
based storage will bring benefit to both the retailer and the consumers.
Since demand level varies a lot across hours, especially for HVAC control,
the cut-off price π˜ will lead to high arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, the condi-
tion Q(π˜) > 3Q(¯λ) is reasonable and also consistent with our simulation setting
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in Section 3.5.5.
Another conclusion from Theorem 8 is that utility-based storage results in
an enlarged CS-RP trade-off curve comparing with the trade-off curve with
consumer-based storage of the same size. This shows that without other con-
sideration, the storage devices should be better controlled by the retailer under
the monopoly retail market structure.
3.5 Numerical results
3.5.1 Parameter setting
In this section, we used the actual temperature record in Hartford, CT, from July
1st, 2012 to July 30th, 2012. The day-head price (used as prediction) and real-
time price (used as realization) were also for the same period from ISO New
England. The HVAC parameters for the simulation was set as: α = 0.5, β = 0.1,
µ = 0.5. The desired indoor temperature was set to be 18◦C for all hours. The
size of total consumers is 1000.
For wind power, we assumed that it is uniformly distributed, and there is no
correlation across different hours.
For solar energy, we used the average solar radiation data [3] of Hartford,
CT, from July 1st to July 31st. The maximum solar panel capacity was set to be
1.5MW.
For storage, we set the storage size as 10KW for indiviual houses, initial
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storage level as 0, all efficiency coefficient as 0.95 and ramp limit as 5KW, and
the percentage of consumers owning storage is 50%.
3.5.2 Benchmark comparisons
In order to show the efficiency of optimized DAHP and the properties of in-
duced CS-RP tradeoff curve, we used the following two pricing schemes to
compare: constant pricing and proportional mark-up pricing.
1. Constant pricing: in this case, the price remains constant for the whole
day, i.e., π1 = π2 = ... = π24. By varying the price, we got the different
CS-RP pairs.
2. Proportional mark-up pricing: in this case, the ratio of day-ahead price to
the expected real-time price remains the same, i.e., π1
Eλ1
=
π2
Eλ2
= ... = π24
Eλ24
.
By varying the ratio, we got different CS-RP pairs.
The trade-off curves under these two schemes and optimal DAHP are plot-
ted together in Fig. 3.1. Fig. 3.1 shows that the trade-off curve between CS and
RP is indeed concave. When the preference weight factor η is 1, which means
that the retailer’s payoff function is social welfare, the resulted retail profit is
zero and the corresponding point on the curve is on the CS-axis.
Comparing the three pricing schemes in Fig. 3.1, the CS-RP trade-off curves
corresponding to constant and proportional mark-up pricing schemes both fall
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Figure 3.1: Comparasion of three pricing schemes
below the Pareto front as we expected, which shows the efficiency of the opti-
mized DAHP.
3.5.3 Effect of utility-based wind power
Assuming the wind power in each hour is uniformly distributed over [0, K], by
varying preference weight on consumer surplus, η, we plotted the CS-RP trade-
off curve as shown in Fig. 3.2. The tradeoff curve is enlarged after wind power
integration.
From the result shown in Fig. 3.2, we can see that when retailer integrates
wind power, the social welfare optimal pricing becomes economically viable,
i.e., the social welfare maximization prices (rightmost points on the trade-off
curve) result in positive retail profit. Furthermore, when the capacity of wind
power is small (K = 1MW), the trade-off curve goes directly up rather than
right, which means that almost all the benefit from wind integration goes to the
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retailer side. On the other hand, when the capacity is larger (K = 3MW), the
trade-off curve goes upright, which means some part of the wind integration
benefit goes to consumer surplus. These results verify the statements in Theo-
rem 6.
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Figure 3.2: Trade-off curve with utility-based wind integration
We also plotted the distribution of wind integration benefit to the consumer
side and to the retailer side with different wind integration levels, as shown in
Fig. 3.3. From the result, we can see that as the level of integration (K) increases,
the fraction of the wind integration benefit to CS, ∆cs(η)
∆rp(η) , also increases, and con-
verges to 13−2η as K goes to infinity, as proved in Theorem 6.
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Figure 3.3: Fraction of wind benefit to consumer
3.5.4 Effect of consumer-based solar energy
Now we consider the case that consumer-based solar energy is used. Two sce-
narios were simulated: the percentage of consumers implement solar energy is
20% and 50%. We plotted these two CS-RP trade-off curves together with the
original CS-RP trade-off curve as in Fig. 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: CS-RP trade-off curve with consumer-based solar energy
Fig. 3.4 shows that with solar energy, the new CS-RP trade-off curve will
cross with the original one. This means that only when the retailer is operating
on the right of the cross point in the beginning, having solar energy can add
benefit to both sides of the retail market.
On the other hand, as the solar energy size increases, the maximized retail
profit decreases, and the cross point moves to the right along the original trade-
off curve. Therefore, the threshold η, which makes adding solar energy benefi-
cial to both sides, increases. However, the maximized social welfare increases
as the size of solar energy increases.
Furthermore, we compared distributed and centralized control of solar en-
ergy with the same level of integration. As shown in Fig. 3.5, the tradeoff curve
with utility-based renewable is completely outside the one with consumer-
based integration, which means that utility-based renewable brings more bene-
fit to the retail market, if no other considerations are taken.
3.5.5 Effect of storage
As discussed in Section 3.4, we considered the effects of both utility-based and
consumer-based storage devices on the CS-RP trade-off curves. With the as-
sumption that utility-based storage has the same size as the consumer-based
storage, ( 20% of the consumers have the storage devices ), the results were
plotted as in Fig. 3.6.
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Figure 3.5: CS-RP trade-off curve comparison with utility-based and
consumer-based solar energy
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Figure 3.6: CS-RP trade-off curve with storage devices
Fig. 3.6 shows that when the retailer has access to the storage devices, the
CS-RP trade-off curve is shifted upward by Q(¯λ) and the social welfare point
becomes economically viable.
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On the other hand, as for the consumer-based storage, when the weight on
consumer surplus η = 1, the retail profit remains zero, and the consumer sur-
plus increases by Q(¯λ). When η = 0, the retailer maximizes its own profit. The
leftmost point on the new CS-RP trade-off curve shows that the consumer sur-
plus increases while the retail profit decreases at a much faster rate comparing
with the original tradeoff curve. In this case, the profit maximization point is
inside the original CS-RP trade-off curve. According to the simulation setting,
the arbitrage profit with cutoff price is much higher than with wholesale price,
Q(π˜) > Q(¯λ), i.e., the condition of Theorem 8 is satisfied.
The CS-RP trade-off curve with consumer-based storage crosses with the
original CS-RP trade-off curve. This means that only when the retailer is op-
erating on the right of the cross point, consumer-based storage can benefit the
retail market. On the contrary, the CS-RP trade-off curves with utility-based
storage is outside the original CS-RP trade-off curve. Therefore, utility-based
storage always benefits the retail market.
Comparing the trade-off curves with utility-based storage and consumer-
based storage, we can see that the former one is completely outside the latter,
which means that having utility-based storage brings more benefit to the retail
market than consumer-based one, if no other considerations are taken.
For utility-based storage, as shown in Section 3.4, the optimal DAHP prices
won’t change after storage is used. As for consumer-based storage, we plotted
the profit maximization prices with different storage implementation levels as
shown in Fig. 3.7. Due to the arbitrage opportunity with consumer-based stor-
age, the price becomes flatter. This shows that only consumer-based storage will
change the consumers’ energy consumption pattern.
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Notice that almost all the end of day prices are the same for these three sce-
narios. The reason is that during a day, both the retail cost and temperature
increase first then decrease. This means that there is little arbitrage opportunity
during the second half of the day. The end of day price is affected by a very
small amount.
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Figure 3.7: Optimal DAHP with storage devices
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CHAPTER 4
ONLINE LEARNING OF DYNAMIC RETAIL PRICE
4.1 Structure of Wholesale Electricity Market
As a participant in the two-settlement market, a electricity retailer faces uncer-
tainties from the wholesale market and the real-time consumptions of its cus-
tomers. If the quantity of consumption is relatively large, the retailer is not a
price taker. Instead, its bidding curve and real-time purchase will affect the
wholesale price. Using a simplified model, we argue in this section that it is
to the retailer’s benefit to match the real time consumption with the day-ahead
dispatched value. In particular, we motivate, by algebraic and economic ar-
guments, that minimizing the 2-norm deviation of the real-time consumption
maximizes the retail surplus. This result motivates the specific form of the cost
used in the regret definition in our online learning formulation of the problem.
4.1.1 The day-ahead wholesale market
In this subsection, we consider a simplified model of LMP calculation. In the
day-ahead market, the independent system operator (ISO) schedules energy
dispatch for the next day. Each electricity generator submits a cost curve c(p)
that represents the cost of serving p units of electricity, while each retailer (or
Load Serving Entity (LSE)) submits a utility curve u(d) that models the benefit
of getting served with d units of electricity. Usually, the day-ahead market dis-
patch is calculated at the hourly time scale. Therefore, both the demand sched-
ule d and the generation schedule p are 24 dimensional vectors.
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With all submitted offers and bids, the ISO solves an optimal power flow
(OPF) problem to obtain the optimal dispatch under the objective of maximiz-
ing the social welfare. In its simplest form without complications of capacity
constrained transmission networks and multiple participating agents, the OPF
problem is of the following form,
maxd,p u(d) − c(p)
s.t. d = p
(4.1)
The solutions, dDA and pDA, represent the desired day-ahead dispatch of de-
mand and generation. The day-head price is defined as the cost of serving
next unit of energy. Therefore, it is the marginal cost of generating pDA, i.e.,
λDA = ∂c
∂p(pDA).
The clearing of the day-ahead market is financially binding in the sense that,
regardless of the actual consumption in real time, the day-ahead payment from
retailer to the system operator is settled as (λDA)TdDA. The payment from the
system operator to the generator is (λDA)TpDA. Since the retailer’s utility of using
dDA is u(dDA), the retail surplus is calculated as,
S DAretail = u(dDA) − (λDA)TdDA. (4.2)
4.1.2 The real-time wholesale market
The actual consumption and generation in real time dRT and pRT, however, are
nominally different from the day ahead dispatch. Consequently, the real-time
price will deviate from the day-ahead price. In particular, if the cost function of
generation in real-time is c˜(p), the real-time price is calculated as λRT = ∂c˜
∂p(dRT),
which stands for the cost of serving the next unit of electricity in real time.
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Different from the day-ahead settlement, the real-time settlement only ap-
plies to the difference between the day-ahead schedule and the real-time con-
sumption. This means that the payment from the retailer to the system operator
is (λRT)T(dRT − dDA) if positive. Otherwise, this quantity represents the compensa-
tion from the system operator to the retailer.
Therefore, if the real-time consumption matches the day-ahead dispatch,
there is no real-time payment. The total retail surplus is still S DAretail. If the actual
consumption dRT is different from dDA, the retail surplus is
S RTretail = u(dRT) − [(λDA)TdDA + (λRT)T(dRT − dDA)], (4.3)
where the first term is the utility of the retailer from delivering dRT to its con-
sumer, and the second term is the total payment to the wholesale market. There-
fore, the surplus loss due to deviation of dRT from dDA is
∆S retail = S DAretail − S RTretail. (4.4)
Based on the Taylor expansion of u(dRT), we can approximate ∆S retail as shown
in the following theorem.
Theorem 9 Under the assumption that cost c(p) and utility u(d) are twice differen-
tiable,
∆S retail ≈ θ(dRT − dDA)T(dRT − dDA), (4.5)
where θ is a constant independent of dRT and dDA
Proof 9 Consider the first order approximation,
u(dRT) − u(dDA) ≈ [∂u
∂d (d
DA)]T(dRT − dDA). (4.6)
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By the KKT condition and the definition of real-time price
∂u
∂d (d
DA) = ∂c
∂p
(pDA) = ∂c
∂p
(dDA). (4.7)
λRT =
∂c˜
∂p
(pRT) = ∂c˜
∂p
(dRT) = ∂c
∂p
(dRT) + ∂∆c
∂p
(dRT), (4.8)
where ∆c(p) = c˜(p) − c(p). As the generation cost function, c(p) usually takes a
quadratic form in practice, i.e., , c(p) = θpTp, where θ is a scalar. Therefore,
∆S retail ≈ θ(dRT − dDA)T(dRT − dDA) + (∂∆c
∂p
(dRT))T(dRT − dDA). (4.9)
Usually, the day-ahead cost function c(p) and real-time cost function c˜(p) have similar
shapes and the perturbation ∆c has small first order derivative. Hence, compared with
the first term in (4.9), the second term can be neglected.
∆S retail ≈ θ(dRT − dDA)T(dRT − dDA). (4.10)
Therefore, the objective of maximizing retail surplus is equivalent to min-
imizing the squared deviation of the real-time demand to the day-ahead dis-
patch.
The result above can also be illustrated in the Price-Quantity plane as shown
in Fig. 4.1. The demand function presents the optimal quantity of energy re-
quired from the retailer given the price. It is actually the derivative of the utility
function u(d). The area below the line is the integration, which is exactly the util-
ity value with quantity d. Similarly, the day-ahead and real-time supply func-
tion stand for the optimal quantity of generation to the generator if the price is
given. The crossing point (dDA, λDA) is the day-ahead equilibrium, the same as
calculated from (4.1). Subtracting the day-ahead payment from the utility, Area
I represents the day-ahead retail surplus.
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Figure 4.1: Real-time market equilibrium
In the real-time market, the real-time consumption dRT deviates from dDA, and
the real-time price, λRT, is determined by the real-time supply function. Area III
is the additional utility gained by consuming dRT, while the sum of area II and
III is the real time payment. Therefore, Area II represents the retail surplus loss,
and the loss grows in the order of ||dRT − dDA||22—the 2-norm deviation between
the day-ahead scheduled consumption and the actual real-time consumption.
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4.2 Dynamic Retail Pricing via Online Learning
4.2.1 Pricing policy and regret
As discussed in Section 4.1, minimizing the demand side surplus loss is equiva-
lent, approximately, to minimizing the squared deviation of real-time electricity
consumption, dRT, from the day-ahead optimal dispatch, dDA.
Formally, define the t-th day’s expected surplus loss as the 2-norm of the
deviation of the real-time consumption from the day-ahead dispatch, i.e.,
Lt
∆
=E[||dRTt − dDAt ||22], where dDAt and dRTt are the day-ahead and real-time demands
for day t.
Assuming the linear demand function in Theorem 2, for the purpose of ob-
taining a performance upper bound, we consider the case that the parameters in
(3.6), G and b, are known to the retailer. In the following, we will use A instead
of G to be consistent with the standard notation in linear regression. At day t,
the optimal retail price is given by
π∗t = argmin
πt
E[||dRTt − dDAt ||22] = A−1(b − dDAt ), (4.11)
and the corresponding minimum surplus loss is only caused by the exogenous
random fluctuations (such as the outdoor temperature). Specifically, the mini-
mized expected loss is
E[||b − Aπ∗t + wt − dDAt ||22] = ||Σw||2, (4.12)
where Σw is the covariance matrix of demandmodel noise w in (3.6). Notice that
the minimized surplus loss is independent of the day-ahead dispatch dDAt .
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However, it is nontrivial for the retailer to obtain the exact parameters of the
demand functions of its customers because a customer is likely to consider such
information private. At day t, the only information available to the retailer is the
record of previous electricity consumption up to t − 1 and day-ahead dispatch
up to t. Formally, the retail pricing policy is defined as follows,
Definition 1 The retail pricing policy µ = (µt) is a sequence of mappings where µt
maps the consumption history and day-ahead demand dispatch to the price vector of day
t. In particular, letting πµt be the price vector under policy µ, we have
π
µ
t = µt(dRT0 , ..., dRTt−1, dDA0 , ..., dDAt−1, dDAt ), (4.13)
where dDAi , and dRTi are the day-ahead dispatch and real-time electricity consumption for
day i. 
As for a particular policy µ, the regret Rµt at day t is defined as the increase of
surplus loss compared with using the optimal price, π∗t , which means that
Rµt
∆
=E[||b − Aπµt + wt − dDAt ||22 − ||Σw||2]
= E[||b − Aπµt − dDAt ||22].
(4.14)
Because maximizing the surplus is equivalent to minimizing the regret, we’ll
focus next on the increasing rate of the cumulative regret up to day T ,
∑T
t=1 R
µ
t .
4.2.2 Lower bound on the growth rate of regret
To gain insights into the lower bound on the regret, we consider first a simple
example when part of the parameters are known. Intuitively, the advantage of
knowing partially the parameters should lead to a lower growth rate of regret.
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In particular, recall the stochastic affine demand function (3.6) where we as-
sume parameter A is known but b is unknown. Consider the following dynamic
pricing policy, µ˜, given by
π
µ˜
t = π¯t−1 + A−1( ¯dRTt−1 − dDAt ), (4.15)
where π¯t−1 and ¯dt−1 are the average price and demand up to day t − 1, i.e.,
π¯t−1 =
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
πi and, ¯dRTt−1 =
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
dRTi . (4.16)
According to (4.14), straight forward calculation gives that the regret for day t is
Rµ˜t = E[||
1
t
t−1∑
i=0
wi||
2
2] =
1
t
||Σw||2. (4.17)
Therefore, the aggregated regret,
T∑
t=1
Rµ˜t =
T∑
t=1
1
t
||Σw||2 ≤ (1 + log T )||Σw||2 (4.18)
Therefore, with the knowledge of the demand function parameter A, the pol-
icy µ˜ achieves the aggregated regret O(log T ) for any b and any arbitrary se-
quence of {dDAt }.
To establish the actual lower bound on the growth rate of regret, we formu-
late a game that, after the retailer proposes a deterministic pricing policy µ, there
exists an adversary designing parameters of the demand function. The adver-
sary is to create the worst loss to the retailer while the retailer tries to minimize
the largest possible loss. In other words, we consider the following the min-max
regret as the objective,
min
µ
max
b,A
T∑
t=1
Rµt .
The following theorem shows that in the min-max sense, the growing rate of
the cumulative regret can not be lower than log T .
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Theorem 10 For any pricing policy µ as defined in (4.13), there exist some
(A, b, dDA0 , ..., dDAt−1, dDAt , ...) to make the cumulative regret,
∑T
t=1 R
µ
t , grows at least at the
rate of log T .
Proof 10 First, we reduce the problem to the case that A is known, dDAi ’s are constant
and Σw is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements all as σ
2
w. The minimax rate for
this case lower bounds the general case.
For any policy µ, the maximum regret among all possible b is
L(µ) = max
b
T∑
t=1
Rµt . (4.19)
Assume the parameter b follows a prior distribution,γn : N(¯b, nσ2I), where n is
a positive integer number and I is an identity matrix. Define the Bayesian cost as
(4.14) and denote the Bayesian estimator of b as ηn. By the property of joint Gaussian
distribution and Sherman-Morrison formula, we can get the minimum Bayesian risk,
Rηnt (γn) = Eηn ||b − ηn(dRT1 , ..., dRTt−1)||22 =
nσ2
σ2w + tnσ2
||Σw||2
Then, the cumulative Bayesian risk
∑T
t=1 R
Bayes
t (γn) is an increasing function of n and goes
to L(µ˜) = ∑Tt=1 1t ||Σw||2 as n goes to∞, where µ˜ is defined in Eq. (4.15).
If µ˜ is not the minimax estimator, there exist some policy µ¯ and ǫ > 0, s.t. L(µ¯) <
L(µ˜) − ǫ. On the other hand, for ǫ > 0, we can find some positive integer m, s.t.
L(µ˜) − ǫ <
T∑
t=1
Rηmt (γm).
By the definition (4.19), the Bayesian risk of policy µ¯ under the distribution γm
should be less than the maximum cost over all possible values of b, i.e.,
T∑
t=1
Rµ¯t (γm) < L(µ¯) < L(µ˜) − ǫ <
T∑
t=1
Rηmt (γm),
which contradicts the fact that ηm is the Bayesian estimator.
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4.2.3 PWLSA: a rate optimal learning policy
In this section, we propose a policy that achieves the lower bound on the regret
growth rate; it is thus optimal in the sense of having the lowest rate of growth.
Referred to as piecewise linear stochastic approximation (PWLSA) policy, the
proposed policy is an extension of the stochastic approximation approach of Lai
and Robin [41] for scaler processes with a single desired optimal price.
If the day-ahead demand is the same for all days, stochastic approximation
will use the previous average price as the nominal value and previous average
demand as the feedback signal to calculate the next price, as shown below,
πSAt = π¯t−1 + γ( ¯dRTt−1 − dDA), (4.20)
where dDA is the constant day-ahead dispatch level, and the feedback factor γ is
a positive scalar.
For multiple day-ahead dispatch levels, we build adaptively a dictionary of
day-ahead dispatch levels that have appeared before. Denote the dictionary at
day t asDt. For day t + 1, if dDAt+1 ∈ Dt, letDt+1 = Dt. Otherwise, Dt+1 = Dt
⋃
{dDAt+1}.
For each day-ahead dispatch level inD =
⋃∞
t=1 Dt, we keep a separate stochastic
approximation to calculate the retail price, in a feedback control fashion similar
as (4.20).
Therefore, for different dDAt , we have a different linear function to calculate
the next retail price. The policy is piecewise linear. Formally, the PWLSA policy,
µPWLSA, is defined as,
Definition 2 (PWLSA) Assume for all t ∈ N+, dDAt ∈ D and D is countable.
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• If dDAt ∈ Dt, thenDt+1 = Dt and
πPWLSAt =
1
|C
dDAt
t |

∑
k∈CdDAt
πPWLSAk + γ(dPWLSAk − dDAt )
 , (4.21)
where C
dDAt
t = {k ∈ N+ : k ≤ t − 1, dDAk = dDAt } and |C
dDAt
t | is the total number of
elements in C
dDAt
t .
• Otherwise, dDAt < Dt, thenDt+1 = Dt
⋃
{dDAt } and
πPWLSAt = π˜ j, (4.22)
where π˜ j is an arbitrary predetermined price.

The following theorem shows that PWLSA can achieve the optimal logarith-
mic regret order.
Theorem 11 Assume that day-ahead dispatch dDAt ’s are from a finite set, i.e., |D| < ∞.
If γ ≥ 12λmin(A) , where λmin(A) is the minimum eigenvalue of A, then we have,
T∑
t=1
Rµ
PWLSA
t ∼ O(log(T )), (4.23)
Proof 11 First, we consider when there is a single day-ahead dispatch level dDA, and
π∗ = A−1(b − dDA). After simplification,
πn+1 − π
∗
n+1
= (I − γA)[Πn−1i=1 (1 − γAi+1 )](π1 − π∗)
+
∑n
k=1{
γ
n
+
∑n−1
j=k [Πn−1i= j+1(I − γAi+1 )] (I−γA)γj( j+1) }ωk.
(4.24)
For the first term in (4.24),
||(I − γA)[Πn−1i=1 (1 −
γA
i + 1
)]||22 ≤ ||(I − γA)||22Πn−1i=1 ||(I −
γA
i + 1
)||22.
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Since (I − γAi+1 )T(1 − γAi+1 ) = I − 2γAi+1 + γ
2A2
(i+1)2 , denoting λm as the minimum eigenvalue of A,
we have,
||(I − γA
i + 1
)||22 ≤ I −
2γλm
i + 1
+
γ2
(i + 1)2 ||A||
2
2.
Let C1
∆
=||I − γA||22. Then, since γλm >
1
2
||(I − γA)[Πn−1i=1 (I − γAi+1 )]||22
≤ C1Πn−1i=1 (I − 2γλmi+1 + γ
2
(i+1)2 ||A||
2
2) = C2 1n+1 ,
where C2 = C1exp{γ2||A||22} doesn’t depend on n.
For the second term in (4.24),
||[Πn−1i= j+1(I − γAi+1 )](I − γA)||22
≤ C1exp{
∑n
i= j+1 −
2γλm
i+1 +
γ2
(i+1)2 ||A||
2
2} ≤ C2( j+1n+1)2γλm .
Then,
||
γ
n
+
∑n−1
j=k [Πn−1i= j+1(I − γAi+1 )] (1−γA)γj( j+1) ||22
≤ {
γ
n
+
∑n−1
j=k ||[Πn−1i= j+1(I − γAi+1 )](I − γA)||2 γj( j+1) }2
≤ 2γ
2
n2
+ 2γC2(1n)(1n )2γλm−1(1k )2−2γλm .
Sum the two terms up,
∑n−1
k=1 ||
γ
n
+
∑n−1
j=k [Πn−1i= j+1(I − γAi+1 )] (1−γA)γj( j+1) ||22
≤ 2γ
2
n
+ 2γC2(1n)(1n )2γλm−1
∑n−1
k=1(1k )2−2γλm ≤ C3 1n .
Define M = max{||π1 − π∗||22, ||Σω||
2
2, ||Σd||
2
2}, we have
∑n
i=1 Ln = E
∑n
i=1 ||A(πi − π∗)||22
≤
∑T
n=1 ||A||22[(C2 + C1)1n]M ≤ C log(T ).
If |D| is finite, and we use a separate stochastic approximation to calculate the retail
price, then the accumulated regret
∑T
n=1 Rn ≤ C|D| log(T ).
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Since log T is shown to be the optimal rate achievable, PWLSA is already the
best in the sense of asymptotic growing rate of the regret. The conditions in the
theorem are quite general. In practice, the cost functions from the generator and
the utility functions from the retailer won’t change often and are usually chosen
from a few alternatives. Therefore, we can assume the total number of possible
day-ahead dispatch levels, |D|, to be finite. On the other hand, the consumers’
demand function is from real data, which can be constrained by a compact set.
Therefore, the bound of the minimum eigenvalue of A is not hard to get with
reasonable assumption.
4.3 Numerical results
4.3.1 Simulation set-up
In this section, we conducted simulations based on the actual temperature
records in Hartford, CT, from July 1st, 2012 to July 30th, 2012. The day-head
price was also for the same period from ISO New England. The HVAC param-
eters for the simulation were set as: α = 0.5, β = 1, µ = 10. The desired indoor
temperature was set to be 18◦C for all hours. The size of aggregation was as-
sumed to be 100.
4.3.2 Learning static parameters
First, we examined PWLSA’s ability to identify the correct price if the parame-
ters of the demand model remain the same. To make the comparison, we used
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative regret
the Greedy Method [7, 47] as a benchmark. At each day, the Greedy Method
makes maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters and uses the result as
the correct parameters to calculate the “optimal” price.
Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3 show the average performance of PWLSA and Greedy
Method over 10,000 Monte Carlo runs. In Fig. 4.2, the induced cumulative
regrets of the two policies are compared. We could identify the logarithmic
growth of the cumulative regret under PWLSA and significant cumulative re-
gret increase by the Greedy Method. Fig. 4.3 shows the absolute percentage
deviation of the prices under the two polices from the optimal price. We can
see that Greedy Method performed extremely bad at the very beginning due to
insufficient learning. After some days, the two policies both produced prices
pretty close to the optimal one.
After carefully investigating the simulated data, we found two typical sce-
narios as shown in Fig. 4.4 and Fig. 4.5. We used the ratio of the calculated price
to the optimal price as y-axis, to show the fluctuation. In most of the cases as
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Figure 4.3: Price convergence
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Figure 4.4: Scenario 1: The two had similar performance
in Fig. 4.4, the two polices gave similar performance and both converged to the
optimal price fast. On the other hand, Fig. 4.5 shows one extreme scenario that
GreedyMethod run into the condition that is close to singularity, which leads to
an abnormal price. Although this kind of scenarios happened rarely, it caused
the wide performance gap between the Greedy Method and PWLSA.
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Figure 4.5: Scenario 2: the Greedy Method failed
4.3.3 Learning dynamic parameters
In the real world, the parameters of the demand model usually do not stay con-
stant. They may follow some cycles or drifts. In this subsection, we tested the
learning ability and robustness of PWLSA under dynamic unknown parame-
ters. Besides the set of parameters above, we used 1.5A instead of A to make the
alternative set of parameters. We assumed the parameters followed a Markov
Chain with these two sets as states. The transition probability to the other set
was assumed to be 0.25.
Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 show the average performance comparison of PWLSA
and the Greedy Method under dynamic unknown demand model. We can see
that PWLSA still outperformed the Greedy Method. According to Fig. 4.6, the
cumulative regret under PWLSA grew linearly. Intuitively, when a sequence
of observation is given, a policy will produce a fixed price or a fixed probabil-
ity distribution over candidate prices (for randomized policy). However, since
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Figure 4.6: Cumulative regret
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Figure 4.7: Price convergence
the next optimal price is random, there always exists a fixed addition to the
expected cumulative regret. Therefore, the linear order achieved by PWLSA is
already the best. Fig. 4.7 shows that the error at the very beginning was the
cause of the performance gap between PWLSA and the Greedy Method.
We also conducted the scenario analysis similar to the static parameter case
as shown in Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.9. Each changing point stands for a incident that
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Figure 4.8: Scenario 1: The two had similar performance
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Figure 4.9: Scenario 2: the Greedy Method failed
the state jumps to the other set. In Fig. 4.8, we can see that the two policies
had similar performance and both tracked the optimal prices well. In few ex-
treme cases, the Greedy Method lost track on the optimal prices wildly at the
beginning a few days, as shown in Fig. 4.9.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we focus on three topics related to real-time electricity pricing:
the effect of data quality on real-time wholesale price, the interaction between
electricity retailer and its consumers, and the online learning of dynamic retail
price.
5.1 Effect of data quality on real-time wholesale price
We report in this part a study on impacts of worst data on the real-time market
operation. A key result is the geometric characterization of real-time LMP given
in Theorem 1. This result provides insights into the relation between data and
the real-time LMP; it serves as the basis of characterizing impacts of bad data.
Our investigation includes bad data scenarios that arise from both analog
meter measurements and digital breaker state data. To this end, we have pre-
sented a systematic approach by casting the problem as one involving an ad-
versary injecting malicious data. While such an approach often gives overly
conservative analysis, it can be used as a measure of assurance when the im-
pacts based on worst case analysis are deemed acceptable.
We note that, because we use adversary attacks as a way to study the worst
data, our results have direct implications when cyber-security of smart grid is
considered. Given the increasing reliance on information networks, developing
effective countermeasures against malicious data attack on the operations of a
future smart grid is crucial. See [38, 35, 27, 34] for discussion about countermea-
sures.
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From a practical viewpoint, our result can serve as the guideline to the real-
time operation. Following the methodology in this thesis, worst effect of a spe-
cific set of meters on real-time LMP can be checked. Once a huge potential
perturbation is detected, alarm should be made and the operator needs to check
the accuracy of these specific data, add protection devices, or even add more
redundant meters.
Although our findings are obtained from academic benchmarks involving
relatively small size networks, we believe that the general trend that charac-
terizes the effects of bad data is likely to persist in practical networks of much
larger size. In particular, as the network size increases and the number of simul-
taneous appearance of bad data is limited, the effects of the worst meter data on
LMP decrease whereas the effects of the worst topology data stay nonnegligible
regardless of the network size. This observation suggests that the bad topology
data are potentially more detrimental to the real-time market operation than the
bad meter data.
5.2 Interactions between electricity retailer and consumers
In this part, we study a day ahead hourly pricing (DAHP) mechanism for dis-
tributed demand response in uncertain and dynamic environments. Such a pric-
ing scheme has the advantage of reducing consumer anxiety of pricing uncer-
tainties and allowing the retailer to optimize the retail pricing adaptively.
We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game in which the retailer plays
the role of a leader and the consumers the followers. For thermal dynamic load,
we obtain an affine form of optimal demand response to DAHP from which the
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retailer optimizes payoff functions of its own and characterize a concave trade-
off between consumer surplus (CS) and retail profit (RP).
The DAHP framework also provides insights into the role of renewable
sources and storage devices. We show that for either renewable energy or stor-
age devices, the effects on CS-RP trade-off are significantly different depending
on whether they are on the retailer side or the consumer side.
5.3 Online learning of dynamic retail price
We present in this part an online learning approach to the dynamic pricing of
electricity of a retailer whose customers have price responsive dynamic load
with unknown demand function. We exploit the linear form of the demand
function for thermal dynamic load, and cast the problem of online learning as
tracking day-ahead dispatch. This approach leads to a simple learning algo-
rithm with the growth rate of cumulative regret at the order of log T , which is
the best rate achievable for any dynamic pricing policies.
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